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COPYRIGHT, FREE EXPRESSION, AND THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF "PERSONAL USE-ONLY"
AND OTHER USE-RESTRICTIVE ONLINE TERMS
OF USE
Bradley E. Abruzzit
Abstract
Expression is simultaneously creative and referential. It is
copyright's task both to supply ownership incentives sufficient to
promote the creation of expressive works, and to carve out creative
(and for that matter, expressive) space from those rights for
subsequent creators. Fair use and uses of copyrighted content that the
Copyright Act has traditionally privileged are therefore themselves
critical to expression. Purveyors of expressive content on the World
Wide Web would challenge copyright's careful balance by
conditioning access to content on the user's acceptance of
nonnegotiable, contractually binding terms of use ("TOU"). Website
TOU commonly impose "personal use-only" restrictions on users that
prohibit uses copyright law would permit. If enforced against critical
and scholarly uses of web content, these TOU could undermine the
great democratizing potential of the come-one/come-all Internet.
Trends in the case law suggest that express and conflict preemption
and unconscionability defenses will likely be unavailing to authors
who engage in prohibited uses of TOU-restricted web content - even
if these uses would be 'fair" under the Copyright Act. Although
individual parties should be free to negotiate away copyright-
approved uses in their dealings with content owners, courts should
not be constrained in finding TOU unconscionable or preempted by
copyright, when circumstances suggest the content purveyor means to
augment its rights unilaterally through nonnegotiable bulk
"contracting." Indeed, when a copyright-approved use of content
subject to TOU is expressive in nature, courts should consider a
possible constitutional defense to enforcement of the TOU.
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INTRODUCTION
Most every professionally-maintained website contains terms of
use ("TOU"), in some form or another. Sites condition access to their
content on visitors' acceptance of these TOU, which generally assume
an agreement between the website and user that is enforceable by
state contract law. TOU may be deployed to all sorts of purposes.
They may set the terms and conditions for online purchases;' they
may limit the site's liability for damage that its content and services
cause to users.2 A site may, through its TOU, obtain the rights to use
and reproduce content users post to a website, for example, comments
to a blog. And TOU may condition or restrict the subsequent uses a
site visitor may make of content that he or she access on the website. 4
It is these TOU - use restrictions - that preoccupy this Article, as it
is increasingly the case that websites interpose use restrictions on
expressive content in excess of the proprietary rights afforded to them
under the Copyright Act.
The most common type of use restriction in a website TOU is a
"personal use-only" restriction. A website that contracts with visitors
only to make personal use of the content it displays deprives visitors
of public privileges made available to them by copyright law. It is not
copyright infringement, for example, to make fair use of content
subject to copyright protection, but personal use-only TOU empower
a website to bring a breach of contract action against certain fair
users. Indeed, a website's proprietor may be able to sue to enjoin (or
obtain damages for) uses of content for which the site owns no
copyright, either because the rights belong to a third party or because
the content is by its nature not subject to copyright protection at all.
Determinations by Congress and the courts regarding what expression
should and should not be copyrightable - as well as what uses of
copyrighted expression ought to be available to the public - reflect
an abiding concern that property rights in one's expression by their
1. See, e.g., StubHub, Inc. User Agreement, http://www.stubhub.com/user-agreement
(last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
2. See, e.g., eBay, Your User Agreement, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-
agreement.html?_trksid-m40 (last visited Jan. 23, 2009) ("Liability").
3. See, e.g., Blogger Terms of Service § 6, http://www.blogger.com/terms.g (last visited
Jan. 23, 2009) ("Intellectual Property Rights") ("By submitting, posting or displaying Content
on or through Google services which are intended to be available to the members of the public,
you grant Google a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license to reproduce, publish and
distribute such Content on Google services for the purpose of displaying and distributing Google
services.").
4. See infra notes 45-52.
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nature impede expression by another.5 Whether or not lawmakers
have struck a proper balance between creating incentives to creativity
and carving out open space in which those same creators may work,
content purveyors online are writing binding rules that upset that
balance decidedly in favor of proprietarization.
This Article discusses the TOU phenomenon on the Internet and
raises a concern that existing case law appears to support a right of
web publishers to graft contract-law protections onto their copyright
prerogatives at the expense of the privileged uses that copyright law
grants to the public. Part I of the Article sets forth a brief overview of
copyright law, focusing specifically on the express limitations that
Congress and the courts have imposed on the rights of creators. This
Part illustrates how copyright law's doctrine of fair use in particular
intends to advance the dual ends of free expression and "the Progress
of the useful Arts and Sciences."6 Part II discusses the emerging
convention on commercial websites that favors "personal use-only"
and other forms of TOU that significantly encumber fair and other
copyright-privileged public uses. Part II goes on to discuss the
implications of these use restrictions for online expression,
particularly at the grassroots level. Part III explains that the use-
restrictive TOU that (purportedly) govern user access to published
web content are an outgrowth of "end user license agreements" that
computer programmers appended to software deliverables. This Part
considers several potential defenses to the enforcement of TOU -
questions of contract formation, copyright preemption,
unconscionability, and the First Amendment specifically. The
decisions of courts that have addressed these defenses to date, largely
in the context of software licensing, point to the enforcement of use
restrictions against web users who would otherwise have sound legal
defenses to a copyright infringement claim.
Part IV argues that, with respect to the preemption,
unconscionability, and constitutional defenses, success or failure of
the defense should turn - at least initially - on the extent to which
the contract was freely bargained and the user obtained fair value in
exchange for his or her waiver of lawful uses of the content. Courts
have so far declined to consider that in typical browsewrap or
clickwrap presentations, that TOU essentially allow private parties to
override, unilaterally and in their favor, the careful balance U.S.
5. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003); see also Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556, 560 (1985).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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copyright law strikes between proprietary rights and public privileges.
As Part IV notes, tiered pricing and more complicated content
delivery models may make it difficult for courts to identify free and
fair, and therefore enforceable, waivers of lawful uses of web content.
However, the most common, one-option browse- or clickwrap
presentation of personal use-only restrictions is a straightforward case
that cries out for invalidation by the courts if the fair use and the
"idea/expression dichotomy," among other well-regarded
compromises of copyright, are to subsist on the Internet as they do
offline.
I. THE COPYRIGHT ACT'S INCENTIVES TO CREATIVITY
AND INDULGENCES TO EXPRESSION
It is worthwhile at the outset to consider briefly the scope and
extent of rights a content creator acquires by the Copyright Act,' and
specifically, the extent to which Congress and the courts have carved
out from creator rights an area of privileged conduct. This includes,
but is not limited to, fair use that the broader public may practice
conducive towards the end of fostering a deliberative, critical culture
consistent with First Amendment values. The Copyright Act confers
certain exclusive rights upon the creators of copyrightable works, i.e.,
works of expressive content "fixed in a tangible medium of
expression." The "bundle of discrete exclusive rights" reserved to
copyright owners includes the rights to reproduce, distribute, perform,
and display copyrightable works, as well as to prepare derivative
works based on the copyrighted material. 9 The Copyright Act affords
copyright owners a variety of remedies against persons who infringe
their exclusive rights. A rightsholder may sue an infringer for actual
damages resulting from the infringement.' 0 The law also permits a
content owner to elect to accept "statutory damages" within a range
set by Congress. A court has the discretion to award statutory
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
8. Id. § 102(a). (The statute enumerates specific kinds of works that Congress has
deemed eligible for copyright protection, including "(1) literary works; (2) musical works,
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6)
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works").
9. New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 & n.4 (2001) (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
106) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2006).
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damages ranging from $750 to $30,000 for each work infringed."
Equitable remedies are available to rightsholders as well: they may
sue to enjoin further infringing conduct, 2  and under certain
circumstances a court may issue an order mandating the impound or
destruction of infringing material.13
Of course, the "ultimate aim" of copyright law is to supply
ownership incentives sufficient "to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good."1 4 This much is apparent from the constitutional
provision that empowers Congress to legislate in this area: Article I's
Copyright Clause grants Congress the authority "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science ... ,by securing for limited Times to Authors ...
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." 5 The exclusive
rights and remedies for infringement set forth in the Copyright Act
are significant, but an author's rights are not absolute. The
Constitution mandates, for example, that copyrights not endure for an
unlimited or indefinite period but "for limited Times," and the
copyright laws in Title 17 of the U.S. Code provide consistently with
that mandate.16 Not all works have the same copyright period,17 but in
every case the law contemplates a moment at which a copyrighted
work lapses into "the public domain" - the body of works that are no
longer (or never were) subject to copyright protection and may be
freely reproduced, distributed, performed, and displayed.'8
For material still under copyright protection, Congress and the
courts have determined that further allowances to the public are
11. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006) (A court may reduce a statutory damages award to $200
per work infringed, if it finds that the defendant "was not aware and had no reason to believe"
he or she was infringing. If a plaintiff is able to establish that the infringement was willful, the
court may award damages of up to $150,000 per work infringed).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2006).
14. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("[T]he Framers intended
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use
of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate
ideas.").
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-204 (2003) (holding that repeated
extensions to the copyright term are not inconsistent with the Constitution's "limited Times"
mandate, because the extended terms still do expire within a definite period).
17. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2006).
18. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 360-64 (1999)
(discussing a proper definition for the term "public domain"); Jessica Litman, The Public
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 975 (1990) (defining the term as "a true commons comprising
elements of intellectual property that are ineligible for private ownership").
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appropriate. A rightsholder cannot absolutely restrict uses of
copyrighted content that implicate the exclusive rights of 17 U.S.C. §
106.19 The Copyright Act enumerates a number of specific uses of
copyrighted material for which the user will bear no infringement
liability.2 0 For example, "libraries and archives" enjoy a statutory
privilege to make and keep archival copies of copyrighted works in
their collections. 21 The law also exempts from infringement the
"performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils in the
course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational
institution, in a classroom or similar place devoted to instruction," 22
as well as any "performance of a nondramatic literary or musical
work or of a dramatico-musical work of a religious nature, or display
of a work, in the course of services at a place of worship or other
religious assembly." 2 3
Most significantly, U.S. law grants the public a privilege to make
24
"fair use" of copyrighted works. By statute, copyright law privileges
the limited use - so long as it is fair - of copyrighted material for
"purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research." 2 5 The fair use doctrine is, by design, flexible and open-
ended. 26 The Copyright Act calls upon courts to apply a four-factor
test in assessing the merit of fair use defenses: courts are to consider
the nature and purpose of the defendant's use of the work, the nature
of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the work
that defendant used, and the effect of the defendant's use on the
copyright owner's ability to market the work in question. 27 Fair use is
therefore a very fact-intensive question; the contours of the privilege
are drawn and redrawn incrementally, on a case-by-case basis.28
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
20. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-112, 119, 121-122 (2006).
21. Id. § 108.
22. Id. § 110(1); see also id. § 110(2) (Somewhat more limited, and conditional,
privileges are available to instructors who conduct classroom exercises remotely, as in distance
leaming environments).
23. Id. § 110(3).
24. Id. § 107.
25. Id.
26. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (2001).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
560-61 (1985).
28. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that "the task
[of determining fair use] is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the
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Accordingly, although they are not listed among the "heartland" fair
uses in 17 U.S.C. § 107, myriads of other uses of copyrighted material
have been recognized by courts as "fair."29
The fair use doctrine reflects the longstanding conviction of
lawmakers that although copyright protection serves as "an engine of
free expression," 30 the public must enjoy some limited privilege to
borrow and build upon the works of others. If, as the Supreme Court
has written, copyright is to be the engine of creativity and expression,
then existing works - in copyright and out - supply that engine's
fuel. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently observed that the doctrine of
fair use, along with the law's distinction between idea and expression,
is a "built-in First Amendment accommodation" that obviates the
need for further constitutional review of the copyright laws. 32 The
First Amendment depends on fair use to keep copyright law from
restricting free expression unduly; copyright law depends on fair use
to enable the continued generation of expressive works for it to
protect.3 3 Otherwise the copyright scheme suffocates itself.3 4
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis," and noting that the examples of fair use
in § 107 are "illustrative and not limitative") (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994)).
29. For example, courts have ruled that incursions on the exclusive rights of copyright
owners may be appropriate toward the end of parody. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593 (for a
collage); see Blanch, 467 F.3d at 258-259 (for the reverse engineering of software); see, e.g.,
Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see Field v. Google Inc.,
412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1123 (D. Nev. 2006) (for indexing web content to make it computer-
searchable).
30. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1985).
31. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575-76 (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619
(C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Story, J.) ("In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can
be, few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout.
Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much
which was well known and used before."); see Carey v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.B.
1803) (Ellenborough, J.) ("[W]hile I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the
enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science."); see also Litman, supra
note 18, at 966 ("[T]he very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea.").
32. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) ("[W]hen, as in this case, Congress
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment
scrutiny is unnecessary.").
33. See Netanel, supra note 26, at 285 (1996) (describing the "precarious balance" that
copyright law endeavors to strike between the cross-purposes of "encourag[ing] authors to
create and disseminate original expression" and "promoting public education and creative
exchange." "If copyright is cast too narrowly," Netanel writes, "authors may have inadequate
incentives to produce and disseminate creative works or may be unduly dependent on the
support of state or elite patrons. If copyright extends too broadly, copyright owners will be able
to exert censorial control over critical uses of existing works or may extract monopoly rents for
access, thereby chilling discourse and cultural development.").
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Clearly, copyright law's charge and challenge is to strike an
ideal balance that maximizes both property-based incentives to
creators and the access and usage rights other speakers require in
order to express themselves (a constitutional value) in their own
original works (a copyright value). In their rulings on copyrightability
and fair use, courts are constantly calibrating and adjusting the scales,
and commentators are always ready with criticism on the direction the
law is taking." This Article leaves for another day the question of
what apportionment of property rights and public use privileges
would be ideal. Of more immediate concern to this article is the
existential threat that website terms of use pose to fair use and other
legal limitations on copyright protections.
II. THE TERMS OF USE CRISIS
Websites of all stripes, commercial 36 and nonprofit 37  alike,
commonly post "terms of use" to govern their relationships with web
browsers. Sites may title them "terms of service," "user agreements,"
or simply "terms of use," but what defines TOU is the intention of
websites to bind users to them on a contract theory; the site conditions
34. Judge Leval prefers a "strangling" analogy, but his point is the same. Pierre N. Leval,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1109-10 (1990); see also, e.g., Jay
Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMi L. REV.
233, 246 (1988) ("In attempting to accommodate these conflicting policies, the fair use doctrine
addresses the fundamental paradox of copyright law, and indeed of all intellectual property law:
the exclusive rights granted to authors may hinder the creation of new works from old ones,
while at the same time providing the financial incentives without which the old works might
never have been created.").
35. Two common complaints are that courts are retrenching on fair use privileges in the
face of powerful publishing litigants. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 26, at 21-22 (expressing
concerns that a "market-centered view of fair use has steadily gained ground" in the courts, as
courts "have repeatedly invoked the bare possibility of licensing in potential markets for the
copyright holder's work to deny fair use," and that "courts have denied fair use even where the
copyright owner's avowed purpose is to suppress publication of material that might show the
copyright owner in an unfavorable light," and that fair use is so flexible and open-ended as to
offer no useful, predictive guidance to the public); see, e.g., Leval, supra note 34, at 1105-07
(1990) ("Writers, historians, publishers, and their legal advisers can only guess and pray as to
how courts will resolve copyright disputes.").
36. See, e.g., Google Terms of Service, http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS?loc=US
(last visited Jan. 23, 2009); Bucknuts Terms of Use, http://bucknuts.com/termsofuse/ (last
visited Jan. 23, 2009); CNN Interactive Service Agreement,
http://www.cnn.com/interactive_1egal.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
37. See, e.g., Amnesty International 2009 Report, Terms and Conditions,
http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Terms%20and%2OConditions (last visited Jan. 23, 2009);
Internet Archive Terms of Use, Privacy Policy, and Copyright Policy,
http://www.archive.org/about/terms.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2009); United States Chamber of
Commerce Terms and Conditions, http://www.uschamber.com/terms (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
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38
a user's access on his or her agreement to abide by the terms. The
specific conditions that a site imposes on users through its TOU are
limited only by the imagination of the persons (usually lawyers) who
draft them. 39 However, certain elements recur, most notably,
limitations on liability and restrictions on the use of content posted on
the site and made available to the user.4 0 Although Section III.B. 1 of
this Article will discuss the question of whether a contract is formed
in the first instance - such that any of a site's posted TOU might be
enforceable against a user who never saw the terms or made any
gesture of assent to them - the remainder of the Article will consider
the cases for and against the enforcement of content use restrictions.
A. The TOU Phenomenon
Not all websites advance TOU, and not all of those that do
impose use restrictions on persons who access site pages. 4 1 For that
matter, sites that do carry use-restrictive terms do not make their
content available on identical terms, although a certain, very limited
scope of licensed uses has come to predominate. The New York Times
website, for example, propounds "Terms of Service" by which
anyone who "choose[s] to use the NYTimes.com service" is deemed
to have agreed "to abide by all of the terms and conditions of this
Agreement between you and The New York Times on the Web."4 2
The Times Terms of Service provides:
38. In this respect terms of use are distinct from copyright notices that, short of
attempting to impose restrictions as content terms, simply state what users may or may not do
with the site's copyrighted material. E.g., Brewster Kaleidoscope Society,
http://www.brewstersociety.com/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2009) ("All text, images, graphics,
animation, videos, music and other materials on this website are subject to the copyright and
other intellectual property rights of GM. These materials may not be reproduced, distributed,
modified or reposted to other websites without the express written permission of GM.")
GM.com, Copyright and Trademark, http://www.gm.com/copyright/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2009);
SGVTribune.com, Copyright Notice, http://www.sgvtribune.com/Copyright (last visited Jan. 23,
2009) ("All text, photos, graphics, artwork and other material on the San Gabriel Valley Tribune
site are copyrighted and may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without
permission.").
39. See, e.g., Internet Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760-61 (D. Colo. 2007)
(describing terms of use that, inter alia, assessed a $50,000 fee for a user's reproduction of any
single web page and granted the site's proprietor "a perfected security interest of $250,000 'per
each occurrence of unauthorized use' of the website in all of the user's land, assets and personal
property").
40. See, e.g., eBay User Agreement, supra note 2 (limitations of liability); infra notes 45-
52, 87-89 (use restrictions).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 80-89.
42. NYTimes.com Terms of Service § 1.1,
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/help/agree.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
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You may not modify, publish, transmit, participate in the transfer
or sale of, reproduce (except as provided in Section 2.3 of these
terms of service), create new works from, distribute, perform,
display, or in any way exploit, any of the Content or the Service
(including software) in whole or in part. 43
Section 2.3's indulgences extend to "personal use-only," and the
section takes pains to add that "[c]opying or storing of any Content
for other than personal use is expressly prohibited," absent permission
from the Times. 44 Hard-copy editions of the New York Times are not
sold subject to personal use restrictions. This "personal use-only"
license is customary for brand-name content sites. Most major media
websites contain TOU with use restrictions similar in scope to the
New York Times's. 45 Local news sources have embraced the personal
use-only trend as well.46 Online retailers,47 search engines,4 8 Internet
only publications,49 state government websiteso corporate sites,5'
43. Id. § 2.2.
44. Id. § 2.3.
45. See, e.g.,Walt Disney Internet Group Terms of Use § 2,
http://disney.go.com/corporate/legal/terms.html (visited Jan. 23, 2009) (governing, inter alia,
Disney.com, ABC.com, ABCnews.com, ESPN.go.com) ("one copy ... for your personal,
noncommercial home use only"); MSNBC.com Terms & Conditions,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3303540! (visited Jan. 23, 2009) ("Restrictions on Use")
("personal, non-commercial use only"); LATimes.com Terms of Service,
http://www.latimes.com/services/site/lat-terms,0,6713384.story (visited Jan. 23, 2009)
("Copyright") ("a single copy for ... your personal, non-commercial use"); British Broadcasting
Corp. Terms of Use § 4, http://www.bbc.co.uk/terms/ (visited Jan. 23, 2009) ("personal, non-
commercial use"). See also Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the
Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 45, 48 (2007) ("Super-copyright
provisions are nearly universal. If you have surfed the web, bought a computer, done online
banking, ordered flowers, purchased a plane ticket, downloaded software, listened to music on
iTunes, or watched a video on YouTube, you have entered into a contract and agreed not to
make use of the material you encountered.").
46. See, e.g., Terms of Use for and.com, http://www.adn.com/help/user-agreement/ (last
visited Jan. 23, 2009) ("Copyrights and Trademarks"); The Vindicator Web Site Terms of Use
and Availability § 2, http://www.vindy.com/legal/tou/index.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
47. See, e.g., Amazon.com Conditions of Use,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.htmnl?ie=UTF8&nodeld=508088 (last visited
Jan. 23, 2009) ("License and Site Access"); Sears.com Terms of Use,
http://www.sears.com/shc/s/nb_10153_12605_NB CStermsofservice?adCell=AF (last visited
Jan. 23, 2009) ("Use of the Site/Services," "Restrictions on Rights to Use").
48. See, e.g., Yahoo! Terms of Service § 18,
http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
49. See, e.g., WebMediaBrands Inc. Web Site User Agreement § 1,
http://www.webmediabrands.com/corporate/legal.html (last visited Sep. 23, 2009) (governing
mediabistro.com); Slate User Agreement and Privacy Policy § 4(a),
http://www.slate.com/id/2111949/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
50. MyFlorida.com Copyright Statement: Conditions of Use § I,
http://www.myflorida.com/myflorida/copyright.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2009); Kansas.gov
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and the websites of NGOS5 2 all incorporate "personal use-only"
restrictions.
Personal use-only TOU restrictions are so much the norm that
the Practicing Law Institute promotes them in a form "Sample Terms
of Use Agreement":
Limited Right to Use. The viewing, printing or downloading of any
content, graphic, form or document from the Site grants you only a
limited, nonexclusive license for use solely by you for your own
personal use and not for republication, distribution, assignment,
sublicense, sale, preparation of derivative works or other use. No
part of any content, form or document may be reproduced in any
form or incorporated into any information retrieval system,
electronic or mechanical, other than for your personal use (but not
for resale or redistribution). 53
Some websites are still more restrictive, imposing terms that permit
no unauthorized reproduction or distribution of site material, in whole
or in part, and without exception. 54
Terms of Use Agreement, http://www.kansas.gov/about/terms of use.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2009) ("Copyright," "Limited Right to Use").
51. See, e.g., McDonalds Internet Site Terms and Conditions,
http://www.mcdonalds.com/terms.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2009) ("Restrictions on Use");
Microsoft.com, Information on Terms of Use, http://www.microsoft.com/info/cpyright.mspx
(last visited Jan. 23, 2009) ("Personal and Non-Commercial Use Limitation").
52. See, e.g., Amnesty International 2009 Report Terms and Conditions, supra note 37.
53. Richard D. Harroch, Legal Issues Associated with the Creation and Operation of
Websites, in I FOURTH ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 537, § 19, at 596 (Practicing Law
Inst. ed., 2000) (emphasis added). Another article encourages websites to make "offensive
use" - pun not apparently intended - of TOU to confer quasi-copyright protection on data not
subject to copyright protection:
Web sites will frequently disclose valuable content to the public, such as pricing
data, which might not otherwise be protected by copyright laws. The inclusion of
a clause limiting the commercial use of such data by Web site users can be
enforced against competing businesses that collect or use such data in an
unauthorized manner.
Adam R. Bialek & Scott M. Smedresman, Internet Risk Management: A Guide to Limiting Risk
Through Web Site Terms and Proactive Enforcement, 20 No. 11 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY &
TECH. L. J. 1, 5 (2008).
54. See, e.g., CBS Interactive Site Terms of Use,
http://www.cbsinteractive.com/termsofLuse.php (visited Jan. 23, 2009) (governing, inter alia,
ZDNet.com, "Tech News, Blogs, and White Papers for IT Professionals") ("You may not
modify, publish, transmit, participate in the transfer or sale of, reproduce, create derivative
works of, distribute, publicly perform, publicly display, or in any way exploit any of the
materials or content on our sites in whole or in part."); Pitchfork Terms of Use,
http://www.pitchfork.com/terms (visited Jan. 23, 2009) ("Any reproduction, copying or
redistribution of the Materials or design elements of the Website for any purpose are strictly
prohibited without the express written consent of Pitchfork .... .").
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B. Implications ofRestrictive TOU for Online Expression
The TOU described above certainly prohibit users from engaging
in conduct that the Copyright Act would tolerate, either as fair use,
use subject to statutory exemption, or use of material that would not
be protected by copyright. Fair use extends much further than the
reproduction of another's material for "personal, noncommercial
use." It is not obvious, and far from settled, what "personal" means in
these TOU, which tend not to define the term. It seems fair to assume,
however, that "personal" means "for personal consumption," and that
any further distribution of a site's content by the user to a third
party - on, or offline - would not pass as "personal." The
Copyright Act privileges the public to use portions of copyrighted
material "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching . .. scholarship, or research,"55 all of which necessarily entail
the communication of the copyrighted material to a third party.
Consider the case in which a blogger wishes to discuss an article
published in the New York Times. The blogger can link to the article
online, but in order to discuss a particular segment of the article, he or
she might choose to copy over that segment of the article in a block
quotation. Publication of a blog post with that block quote would
violate the "agreed" usage restrictions on NYTimes.com, because the
publication would not be a "personal" use of the content made
available there.5 6 And if the blogger were established or influential
enough to charge users to access the blog's content or earn any
revenue whatever from the blog - say, from advertising on the
site - the use would offend the TOU as "commercial," too.
Consider another example: a defense contractor or
environmental NGO publishes a press release on a website subject to
personal use-only TOU. This time the influential blogger uses an
excerpt from the press release in a blog entry that criticizes the
contractor/NGO. As part of an effort to suppress online criticism of
the organization, the contractor/NGO's attorneys bring suit against
the blogger. Although fair use would surely protect the blogger
against a copyright claim - the blogger deploys the content for a
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
56. See NYTimes.com Terms of Service, supra note 42, §§ 2.2-2.3. This result is not
only objectionable from the standpoint of free expression and constructive online debate, but it
demonstrates the bizarre disjunction between hard-copy media and its online counterpart. The
blogger would be free to "use" a portion of the article if he or she obtained it from a purchased
newsprint copy - or even on microfilm or microfiche. Content available in those formats is
subject to no contractual restrictions in excess of what the Copyright Act forbids. If the blogger
clips the very same material from NYTimes.com, the Times has a breach of contract claim.
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"transformative" use: critical commentary - the blogger has no fair
use defense against a contract claim based on the site's TOU. By
selecting when and where to enforce its TOU, a person or
organization can use contract law to place severe restrictions on how
the public may speak of it.
Other examples of forbidden fair uses abound. Google copies
entire websites into its searchable index. When it displays search
results, Google post links to "cached" copies of web pages on its own
servers. Users can click to the cached copies to find pages that crop
up in search results but may no longer subsist on the web; the cached
copies also highlight the user's search terms, so that users may find
them more easily. At least one court has upheld these unauthorized
reproductions and displays as fair uses, 57 even though they would
offend restrictive TOU. Large commercial websites will not object to
Google indexing their sites (indeed, most websites would not), but if
they so chose, their TOU would give them a cause of action.
Similarly, efforts to crawl and copy evanescent web content into
archives for posterity can collide - and already have, in at least one
case - with TOU that permit only personal use of a site's content.
Courts have not yet ruled that copyright law would allow a person to
archive another's web content, but the Google cache page decisions
point to a fair use finding. 59
Personal use-only TOU would also support claims against users
who could otherwise point to express exceptions to liability in the
copyright laws. The Copyright Act's face-to-face teaching
exemption 60 allows a university lecturer - indeed any teacher at a
non-profit educational institution - to read aloud text from the web
57. Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1123 (D. Nev. 2006). Cf Parker v. Google,
422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497-98 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff'd, 2007 WL 1989660 (3d Cir. July 10, 2007)
(not reaching the fair use question, holding instead that Google's conduct could not violate the
Copyright Act because the alleged unauthorized copying and distribution of cached web pages
could not be said to be "volitional acts" on Google's part). In both Field and Parker Google
asserted the further defense that a "system caching" safe harbor, enacted as part of the DMCA,
precluded any copyright infringement liability. See id. at 498 (citing Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at
1122-25). The system caching safe harbor, contained in 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (2006), applies only
to claims of copyright infringement, and certainly not to contract claims predicated on TOU.
58. See Internet Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760-61 (D. Colo. 2007).
59. Indeed, the text on a website's TOU page is itself subject to the terms: this Article's
limited quotation of the language of website TOUs, as in footnote 46, would violate the TOU.
Although we assume above that the hypothetical blogger could post a link to a TOU-ed website,
the site owner could even colorably argue - though without guaranteed success - that the use
of URLs associated with web pages is subject to restrictive TOU. An aggressive website could
leverage personal use-only TOU to control who links to the site.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (2006).
98 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
in class, or even display it to his or her students on an overhead
projector. Such use would hardly qualify as "personal." Performance
or display of web content in a religious service is also a privileged use
under the Copyright Act.6' Restrictive TOU effectively override the
limited rights of libraries to archive the works they cover under 17
U.S.C. § 108.
In short, if courts treat them as enforceable, personal use-only or
stronger TOU would grant anyone who distributes content on the
Internet the ability to write fair use and other statutory privileges out
of the law, at their option. To be sure, a website plaintiff would have
only a contract claim against a violator, and not a copyright claim -
and the remedies available in contract are less extensive than under
the Copyright Act. The website owner would not have the hammer of
statutory damages to brandish against infringers. It would have to
prove actual damages flowing from the violation, which would be a
difficult and more costly proposition in litigation, leading often to a
less significant damages award. Injunctive relief could still be
available, however: a TOU claimant could demand in its complaint
that the court issue an order requiring full compliance with the
TOU. 62 Such an order would compel a user of termed-up web content
to stop using it.
The consequences of enforcing these TOU would be significant.
For centuries the economics of publication in physical media have
constricted the flow of expressive works - whether artistic,
academic, critical, or political in nature - from their creators to the
public. Only so many works can be printed and in only so many
copies; only so many works can be shipped, stocked, and shelved.63
61. Id. at § 110(3).
62. Software developers commonly litigate for injunctions requiring defendants to adhere
to the terms of their end user license agreements. See, e.g., XPEL Techs. Corp. v. Md.
Performance Works Ltd., Civ. No. SA-05-0593, 2006 WL 1851703, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 19,
2006) ("XPEL requests actual damages, exemplary damages, permanent injunctive relief
mandating Defendants' compliance with the terms of the EULA, judgment declaring
Defendants' use of XPEL's property as unlawful, and attorney's fees."); see e.g., Davidson &
Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1167 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (listing
"breach of the EULAs and TOU" among the plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief). Software
EULAs operate in a manner very similar to website TOU, and a defendant in a TOU case will be
put to the task of distinguishing the groundswell of cases supporting EULA enforcement. See
infra Part Ill.
63. Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information and Law,
76 N.Y.U. LAW. REv. 23, 93 (2001) ("While there is no formal limitation on anyone producing
and disseminating information products, the economic realities limit the opportunities for
storytelling in the mass-mediated environment and make storytelling opportunities a scarce
good.").
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These limitations in turn constrain the diversity of content made
available, as content purveyors (or their advertisers) are driven to
tailor their works for the broadest possible appeal or approval.6
Digital media and the Internet have broken the bottleneck by
dramatically reducing the effort and expenditure required to
reproduce and distribute expressive works. Commentators therefore
have often noted the great potential of the Internet to promote, as the
Copyright Clause would have it, "the progress of Science," by
enabling just about anyone to convey his or her ideas to a worldwide
audience, with no regard for the limitations of time and space - and
little regard for cost. 66 A robust fair use privilege is as necessary to
enable the production and dissemination of digital works in the 21st
century as it has been offline in the past. In fact, the proliferation of
contractual restrictions on fair use online threatens to undercut
perhaps the most significant benefit of the Internet Age - the ability
of any person with a connection to broadcast his or her creative works
to anyone else in the world.
Moreover, much has been made of the Internet's potential to
reshape political discourse. The truest deliberative democracy allows
all of its constituents to argue and inform on the important matters of
the day. Our First Amendment promotes that ideal, but in practice
problems of time and distance complicate matters. The loudest and
most omnipresent voices are heard - and in the world of physical
media these characteristics tend to coincide with access to capital. A
large-scale publisher can disseminate its ideas far and wide and
thereby exercise a disproportionate amount of argumentative
authority. For example, an established television network or radio
64. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT'T L.J. 215, 262-64 (1996).
65. E.g., id. at 260-61 ("Distribution in a digitized form makes information more
accessible by allowing more information to be distributed to more people at less costs."); see
also Note, Exploitative Publishers, Untrustworthy Media, and the Dream of a Digital
Revolution for Artists, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2438, 2438, 2446-47 (2001).
66. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership: Reconsidering
Incentives in a Digital Age, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 1121, 1135 (2003); Note, supra note 66, at 238,
246-47.
67. See Benkler, supra note 64, at 110 ("[A]utonomy, like democracy and robust political
discourse, supports a strong normative commitment to attaining an information environment in
which stories are told by diverse and antagonistic sources.").
68. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW To LOCK DOwN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 163-66 (2004). Trends in
copyright law to support the interests of large-scale content purveyors are reinforcing the
hegemonies that media companies have acquired through consolidation. See also id. at 110
(expressing concern that an "enclosure movement" in copyright law, reflected in extensions to
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conglomerate can buy up large swaths of the broadcast band and
dominate the airwaves. But the Internet has promised to alter these
dynamics. It seeks to ensure that through technology that every voice
can be heard (if you can find it), and on largely - if not exactly -
equal terms. 69 Anyone with modest means can start a website or
weblog, peddle his or her wares in the marketplace of ideas, and
slowly build a business. One accumulates authority "from the bottom
up" - on the strength of one's ideas, and not particularly because of
some privileged access to a microphone, printing press, or broadcast
transmitter.
The promise of bottom-up democratic participation and
deliberation is yet another promise that the Internet will not deliver
without unfettered fair use and the other public privileges lawmakers
have carved out of copyright. Websites that insist on personal use-
only content distribution propose to deliver proprietary content to as
many persons who may want it, but to each person individually, at his
or her terminal, and the person may make no further use of it. The end
user is an endpoint: website TOU consider and reject the notion that
the users may themselves wish to be a part of the network - quoting,
discussing, building on the content they receive to create works of
their own. It is not surprising that the content providers most inclined
to adopt overly restrictive terms of use are the content providers that
have already grown powerful managing the information-flow
scarcities offline. 70  Entrenched media interests have grown
comfortable working in the hierarchical offline paradigm, in which
there are media and there are audiences.71 These organizations do not
the copyright term and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's incursions on fair use, is
"increasingly subject[ing] the cultural commons from which we draw to form our
understandings of the world to the control of a small number of professional commercial
producers").
69. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Social Costs ofProperty Rights in Broadcast
(and Cable) Signals, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1303, 1361 (2007) ("One of the consequences of
the internet and the emergence of digital technologies is that it decentralizes and democratizes
the process of distribution.") (citing YOCHAi BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How
SoCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006)).
70. See Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 25 (1990) (suggesting that
"intellectual property, paracopyright, and digital rights management are being invoked .. . to
control how ordinary individuals experience the Internet" and describing "a desire for greater
control over how individuals will be permitted to use digital networks and digital content").
71. See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 563-65
(2000). Benkler explains that the economics of "mass media markets" have promoted a
convention of audiences as passive "consumers," whereas the Internet, "at least as it was in the
1990s," holds out the prospect of audiences as "users":
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typically seek to interpose contractual restrictions on fair use of the
content they deliver in hard copy. The idea that audiences might
become media is revolutionary: it was never before so easy for
anyone to create and publish a work, and in so doing make use of a
preexisting work.72 Offline, Publisher B's work makes fair use of
Publisher A's work. Online, a million self-publishers can post content
that cuts, references, reworks, or even collages Publisher A's work.73
Fair use is a grander proposition and a greater imposition on these
publishers in the digital world, but fair use must be allowed and
supported there nonetheless.74
That there should exist and flourish some publisher-created
exception to copyright-privileged uses in digital media is all the more
troubling when one considers that content continues to migrate out of
physical media into digital space. Reports on the death of physical
media - the newspaper, the book - are greatly exaggerated, to be
sure. But over time the Internet will surely become the principal
forum where content is distributed and where the public meets to
inform itself and to deliberate. It will be where one watches
Presidential debates and where one argues the merits of the respective
candidates, where one buys the new Stereolab album and where one
reads and writes critiques of the songwriting. Use-restrictive TOU
propose a different, stricter set of rules in the digital environment than
Users sometimes receive information and sometimes rework it and send it to
others. They can play the roles of producer and consumer. Their acts of reception
are dialogic in the sense that they can easily be mapped as moves in a
conversation rather than as endpoints for the delivery of a product.
Id. at 564; see also Balkin, supra note 70, at 33-34 (2004) ("Internet speech is participatory and
interactive. People don't merely watch (or listen to) the Internet as if it were television or radio.
Rather, they surf through it, they program on it, they publish to it, they write comments and
continually add things to it. Internet speech is a social activity that involves exchange, give and
take. The roles of reader and writer, producer and consumer of information are blurred and often
effectively merge.").
72. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 212 (2006) (observing that the Internet has
"fundamentally altered the capacity of individuals, acting alone or with others, to be active
participants in the public sphere as opposed to its passive readers, listeners, or viewers.").
73. Balkin, supra note 70, at 33-34.
74. The very structure of the Internet - and the World Wide Web, in particular, with its
linking, framing, and embedding protocols - promotes an unprecedentedly referential and
cumulative expressive culture. Id. at 33. On that basis one could argue that it actually means
more to vindicate fair use online than offline: HTML code does not challenge copyright so much
as it recognizes the very cumulativeness, the interconnectedness of expressive works that
underlies the fair use doctrine. The Web enables users to explore these relationships with an
ease and convenience they never enjoyed in the hard-copy environment; its protocols assume
fair use and draw out its potential.
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exist currently in the hard-copy environment. As (or if) digital modes
of reproduction and distribution begin to predominate over the less
efficient old-school channels, the mainstreaming of these TOU
amounts to a frontal assault on fair use itself.
And indeed, when TOU purport to expand the scope of
proprietary content beyond what is copyrightable, the promise of
street-level publication on matters of public interest grows still
dimmer. Mass media organizations exclusively acquire, process, and
deliver most of the information that the public receives. In many
cases, Big Media and Big Media only have access to an information
source: there are only so many chairs in the White House press room,
so many opportunities to "embed" reporters with American soldiers in
Iraq. Mass media organizations have resources that bloggers do
not - full-time investigative reporters on staff, relationships with
government sources, or at the least, money to conduct costly fact-
gathering. It seems fair and appropriate that media organizations that
expend capital to gather information should enjoy the right to profit
from their investment; it seems excessive that mass media should
dictate terms of use of the information they channel and label that
information for personal consumption only - otherwise get
permission.75 Copyright laws' distinctions between what is
protectable and non-protectable matter - expression of ideas, but not
the ideas themselves; original content, but not facts - strike a
reasonable, if occasionally imperfect balance between the interests of
creators and audiences.76 It is not clear that a website with artfully-
written TOU could not bring a contract claim for the defendant's use
of facts, ideas, or even public domain content made available there. 7 7
Of course, the Internet is a diverse community of information,
and not all of its content is locked down on personal use-only terms.
75. The free trade in permissions among large media organizations empowers them
together against small-time critics and content generators. For example, one television network
might freely grant another permission to use its news programming's video footage, on the
theory that institutions with equivalent, but not identical, access to news coverage have much to
gain by pooling footage (so long as each network is able to make first publication of exclusive
material). The same mutuality of interest is not apparent when, say, a blogger seeks to use news
clips, or facts gathered by news organizations. See infra note 77, as reference or jumping-off
points for discussion.
76. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985); see
id. at 588 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Sony of Am. Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)); Dratler, supra note 34, at 246-47.
77. See Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 1025, 1063-64 (1998) (observing that "strict limits on commercial re-use . ..
are often associated with websites that provide data or information that is primarily factual and
thus likely benefits from little or no copyright protection").
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Open-source and open-content advocates have created and promoted
standard-form "copyleft" licenses to counter the mainstream trend in
restricting web content.78 The GNU Project, writer of the open-source
Unix operating system software, promulgates a GNU Free
Documentation License for anyone to append to their web content.79
The Free Documentation License imposes its own range of
restrictions - for example, conditions on modification and mass
distribution - on content that would likely be delivered
unencumbered in hard copy.80 Indeed, the license itself states that
although "[e]veryone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim
copies of this license document, but changing it is not allowed."81 But
the Free Documentation Licenses allows largely unrestricted use of
the licensed material:
You may copy and distribute the Document in any medium, either
commercially or noncommercially, provided that this License, the
copyright notices, and the license notice saying this License
applies to the Document are reproduced in all copies, and that you
add no other conditions whatsoever to those of this License. You
may not use technical measures to obstruct or control the reading
or further copying of the copies you make or distribute....
You may also lend copies, under the same conditions stated above,
and you may publicly display copies.82
Although specifically prepared to license the accompanying
documentation for open-source software, 83 websites - Wikipedia,
most notably - have attached the Free Documentation License to
other content as well.84
Another open-content initiative, Creative Commons, offers
owners of web content a menu of simple licenses to add to their sites.
At Creative Commons's license webpage, a user can check boxes
indicating what uses he or she would allow for their content, along
78. Christina J. Hayes, Changing the Rules of the Game: How Video Game Publishers
Are Embracing User-Generated Derivative Works, 21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 567, 585 nl.129,
130 (2008).
79. GNU Free Documentation License v. 1.3, §§ 3, 4 (Nov. 2008),
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/fdl.txt (visited Jan. 23, 2009).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. §2
83. Id. § 0 ("Preamble").
84. See Wikipedia, Main Page ("All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free
Documentation License."), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MainPage (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
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with a jurisdiction for their licenses." Creative Commons then
generates one of a number of licenses to fit the user's specific
permutation of preferences; the site presents HTML code that the user
can attach to his or her site. The code links to a full explanation of the
86license provision on the Creative Commons website. None of the
license options available through Creative Commons is as restrictive
as the personal use-only terms commonly advanced on the Web.
A license format is attractive to open-content advocates because
it enables rightsholders to make their content available on terms more
generous than the Copyright Act might, with its static package of
statutory exceptions and fair use privileges. Just as closed-content
sites use licenses to overlay contract-based restrictions on use that
copyright law would not countenance, institutions like the GNU
Project and Creative Commons can deploy licenses to shift the
allocation of rights and privileges between the creator and users of
web content away from copyright's baseline - but in users' favor.
Sites also write TOU that expressly permit fair use. The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts website contains TOU that prohibit
"any copying or use other than 'fair use' under the Copyright Act.""
CNN.com's Interactive Service Agreement strictly prohibits
unauthorized reproduction of distribution of site content, but only up
to a point: the site allows uses of its content that are "expressly
permitted under copyright law."88 A number of popular weblogs and
online-only publications encourage their readers to make fair or even
unfettered use of their content.89
Restrictive TOU may thus be the norm in mainstream online
media, but practices do vary, and movements like Creative
Commons's and the GNU Project have taken steps to promote a
culture of open content on the Internet. Activists and web publishers
85. See Creative Commons, License Your Work, http://creativecommons.org/license/
(last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
86. Id. (input data; then follow "Select a License" hyperlink)
87. Mass.Gov Terms of Use,
http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=mg2utilities&L=1&sid=massgov2&U=utility-policy-terms (last
visited Jan. 23, 2009). By its terms, however, the Massachusetts website would preclude uses
subject to statutory exemptions other than fair use. Whether by design or simply by oversight,
the Commonwealth's TOU are therefore more restrictive than the Copyright Act.
88. CNN Interactive Service Agreement, supra note 37, T 5(B).
89. See, e.g., Daily Kos: State of the Nation, http://www.dailykos.com/ (last visited Jan.
23, 2009) ("Site content may be used for any purpose without explicit permission unless
otherwise specified."), Gawker Media Terms of Use, http://gawker.com/advertising/legal/ (last
visited Jan. 23, 2009) ("Use of Content") (posting a "Some Rights Reserved" Creative
Commons license).
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are hastening to create a nonproprietary space on the Net - or at least
one that lives by the rules and conventions that govern content offline.
There still remain, however, great swaths of online content that at
least purport to be locked down by contract. This Article's next Part
shows that case law currently on the books would appear to support
enforcement of the contracts that websites are foisting on their
viewers.
III. TRIED AND POTENTIAL DEFENSES TO ENFORCEMENT
OF TOU
Before proceeding to discuss the prospects of legal defenses to
enforcement of website TOU, it is worth pausing to consider the
preceding generation of software licensing agreements that - not
without generating controversy of their own - laid the groundwork
for TOU's frontal assault on copyright-approved expressive uses of
content.
A. Software Licensing and TOU
The imposition of terms of use to govern website access has its
origin in software sales practices. It has become a routine business
practice for software developers not to sell copies of their copyrighted
works - as print publishers do with books and magazines - but to
sell licenses to use software. 90 The introduction of end-user license
agreements ("EULAs") predated the extension of copyright protection
to computer code; as one court notes, software developers deployed
EULAs "to augment trade secret protection in order to protect against
unauthorized copying at a time when, first, the existence of a
copyright in computer programs was doubtful, and, later, when the
extent to which copyright provided protection was uncertain." 91 Even
after computer programs received copyright protection, developers
continued to eschew conventional "copy sales" in favor of EULAs,
principally toward the end of circumventing the Copyright Act's "first
sale doctrine," 92 which allows the purchasers of a copy of a work to
90. See generally Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091-
92 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing abundant expert testimony explaining that the sale of licenses, and
not copies, is the predominant business model for software distribution).
91. SoftMan Prods. Co v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord."). Of particular concern to software developers was the possibility that the first
sale doctrine might allow buyers to lend or lease software they purchased to third parties. See
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resell that work free of encumbrance by the copyright holder.93 Courts
are not of a single mind on the question whether EULAs can fairly
accomplish this result, but the weight of authority supports
enforcement of EULA terms that would impair the rights of a copy
buyer under the first sale doctrine.94
Other licensing restrictions are common. For example, software
licensing agreements frequently contain prohibitions on reverse
engineering. 9 5 The fair use doctrine affords the public a limited
privilege to reverse engineer copyrighted software. However,
because the indulgences given to reverse engineering flow from the
doctrine of fair use, they only relieve a user of liability for copyright
infringement. A software license that expressly or implicitly forbids
reverse engineering opens up contractual liability for the reverse
engineer, notwithstanding that the practice has been ruled fair use.
Software licenses also contain personal use-only provisions -
indeed, the similar provisions that appear in website TOU likely find
their origin in these license restrictions. As the Ninth Circuit recently
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991). By 1990,
Congress amended § 109 so that it would prohibit purchasers of a "computer program" from
lending, leasing, or renting the program "for direct or indirect commercial purposes," See 17
U.S.C. § 109(b), but § 109(a) still preserves the right ofa software buyer to sell a used computer
program outright.
93. Step-Saver Data Sys., 939 F.2d at 96 n.7.
94. Compare, e.g., SoftMan Prods. Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1083-89 (C.D. Cal. 2001),
with, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 784-85 (9th Cir.
2006); Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1177-78
(E.D. Mo. 2004); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1060 (N.D.
Cal. 2002); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1090-92.
95. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 634 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005)
("Subject to that Grant of Licence hereinabove, you may not, in whole or in part, copy,
photocopy, reproduce, translate, reverse engineer, derive source code, modify, disassemble,
decompile, create derivative works based on the Program, or remove any proprietary notices or
labels on the Program without the prior consent, in writing, of Blizzard." (quoting the EULA in
litigation)); Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 203
(3rd Cir. 2002) ("Customer shall not modify, reverse engineer, reverse assemble or reverse
compile any Program or part thereof. . . .") (quoting the EULA in litigation)); see also, e.g.,
United Asset Coverage, Inc. v. Avaya Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1020-21 (N.D. Ill. 2006);
Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2005);
Dreamcatcher Software Development, L.L.C v. Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc., 298 F. Supp.
2d 276, 288 (D. Conn. 2004).
96. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992))
("[R]everse engineering object code to discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is
a fair use."); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Where
there is good reason for studying or examining the unprotected aspects of a copyrighted
computer program, disassembly for purposes of such study or examination constitutes a fair
use.").
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wrote, "By licensing copies of their computer programs, instead of
selling them, software developers maximize the value of their
software, minimize their liability, control distribution channels, and
limit multiple users on a network from using software
simultaneously." 9 7 That is, software licenses are written to advance
the interests of the developers, whatever they might be, and their
terms hardly reflect vigorous arms-length bargaining between the
developer and the consumer.
Putting aside the obvious attraction of license-style content
distribution - that the licensor is positioned to write its own rules -
it was not obvious or intuitive that a license/TOU paradigm should
surface to overlay contract terms on users' access to web content. To
be sure, some of the content available online is downloadable
software, and it seems logical that software companies would press
license terms on software obtained in this manner - just as they do
for the software they distribute in physical media. However, the vast
majority of the copyrighted content offered on the web is not
computer software but written text, graphic illustrations and
photographs, digital sound recordings, and audiovisual works
rendered in digital format. Such works have less in common with
computer software than they do with analogous works distributed in
physical media. It is not a business practice of print publishers to sell
novels and newspapers with terms of use attached - nor do they
purport to sell "licenses" to read copyrighted works instead of actual
copies.98
But this is not to say that traditional hard-copy media publishers
could not, if they so chose, reconfigure their marketing to sell licenses
to works rather than complete copies. Record companies already
assert this prerogative routinely with respect to "promotional"
compact discs issued free of charge to record companies. 99 If software
97. Wall Data Inc., 447 F.3d at 785 n.9 (citing Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in
the 21st Century: Are Software "Licenses" Really Sales, and How Will the Software Industry
Respond?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 555 (2004)).
98. See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,
44 B.C. L. REV. 577, 583-84 (2003).
99. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
UMG distributed advance promotional copies of its recordings to select "insiders"; the CDs
contained the following language:
This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the intended
recipient for personal use only. Acceptance of this CD shall constitute an
agreement to comply with the terms of the license. Resale or transfer of
possession is not allowed and may be punishable under federal and state laws.
Id. UMG brought copyright claims against Augusto for selling the promotional CDs on eBay in
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companies can license computer programs deliverable in CD-ROM
formats, there is no obvious reason why publishers might not go a
further step to sell licenses to works on CD, rather than CDs
themselves.' 00 Some 150 years of tradition support a public privilege
to make fair use of copyrighted content published in print and other
hard-copy formats.' 0' A restructuring of the hard-copy market - and
consumer expectations - to introduce restrictive terms of use
alongside these works would be a controversial proposition, at best. 102
There is not the same long public momentum in favor of fair use
of digitized content made available on websites. And there are
reasons why web content, although similar in nature to the content in
books, newspapers, compact discs and DVDs we buy in hard-copy
markets, might cry out for license-style treatment. First, content is
made available for display on a website. We conceive of the web as a
network of "sites" - "places" that users "visit" to experience content.
In this respect a web page is more readily analogized to a theater than
to a book - or to a bookstore or newsstand. The local AMC or
Loew's displays movies to the public, provided that the public pays
the price of admission. The moviegoer does not receive a copy of the
film to take home. Second, web content is quite often made available
to the public free of charge: content is often advertisement-supported,
or it brings in no revenue at all. A site visitor who accesses content
violation of the license terms.
100. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), a century-old copyright case, the
Supreme Court looked askance at a publisher's attempt to impose a condition on book buyers
such that resale of a work for under $1.00 would qualify as copyright infringement. The first-
sale doctrine mandated a finding of noninfringement. The Bobbs-Merrill Court was ruling on a
copyright claim, not a contract claim, and cases supporting the use of EULAs have relied on this
fact to reconcile their holdings to the Court's. E.g., Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc.,
216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("In this case, Adobe has elected to distribute its
products via license rather than sale. Adobe alleges that their OCRA and EULA are clearly
licenses."); id. at 1060 (citing Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086,
1091 (N.D. Cal. 2000)) (holding that the terms of Adobe's EULA support a license, such that
the first-sale doctrine does not apply). Had the publisher in Bobbs-Merrill established a binding
contract, with the $1.00 resale minimum as a term, its case would be no different from any of
the Adobe cases - except for the nature of the copyrighted work.
101. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM & MARY L.
REv. 1525, 1588 (2003) (tracing fair use "[als a formal concept" back to two 195 -century
decisions by Justice Story, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), and
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136)).
102. One commentator does note that "[blooks and other printed works, the most
traditional of copyrighted works, are increasingly accompanied by copyright notices that . . .
purport to restrict unauthorized re-use of the copyrighted material." Madison, supra note 77, at
1065 (citing a copyright notice in a case book on intellectual property law). Such notices do not
give rise to contract rights - they only strictly forbid noncommercial uses and nowhere suggest
that the buyer is bound by contract to comply with the prohibition.
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for free may not feel the same entitlement to make use of it as he or
she does the book bought at Barnes & Noble.
What makes the Internet unique - and uniquely problematic -
is that by their nature, websites simultaneously display content and
make it available for reproduction and further distribution. 10 3 Web
browsing applications commonly enable users to cut and paste text, to
download audio and video where websites allow it, to right-click on
individual images to save copies, and indeed to save entire web pages
to personal hard drives. Thus, as much as a user's direct interface with
a website is display-oriented, the user has at his or her fingertips the
means to copy some or all of the site's content. These reproductive
faculties are secondary to the web experience - one has to go to the
site and view the content before taking a copy for keeps, and it is
often, if not almost always, sufficient for a user simply to experience
the content on the site - and to the site owner, who is principally
concerned with driving user traffic to the website, these faculties are
cause for concern, for obvious reasons. A website's TOU page is its
box office, the "place" where it imposes conditions on access. The
movie theater is content simply to collect the price of admission
before displaying the film. The website, understanding that one who
accesses content has the capacity to make innumerable perfect copies
of its content, may find itself compelled to impose conditions on what
users can do with the copies.
Some proponents of website TOU have sought to enforce terms
against users who have acted outside of the posted guidelines. Cases
on the enforceability of TOU have trickled into the law reports, most
notably on the question of contract formation: can a user be bound to
terms to which he or she has made no affirmative gesture of assent
and for that matter, may not even have seen on the site? Courts are
moving in the direction of a yes answer. Other defenses that might be
available to users - preemption, unconscionability - have been
asserted, more or less unsuccessfully in cases involving software end
user license agreements.104 In fact, most of the currently applicable
precedent is directed at the enforceability of EULAs. 05 In their
103. Indeed, the display only occurs by way of the user's web browser application copying
data from the website's content server and displaying the copy to the user. In fact, browser
applications universally contain a feature whereby web content is "cached" locally on a user's
hard drive for faster retrieval and display when the user makes subsequent visits to the website.
104. Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003); ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
105. See infra Part 1I.B. See generally Bowers, 320 F.3d 1317 (software license
agreement); ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447 (software license agreement); Vault Corporation v. Quaid
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efforts to uphold a widely-supported distribution practice in an
industry not particularly suited to copyright protection, courts have
opened the door to broader use of content licensing that impinges on
the privileges reserved to the public by copyright law. The law on the
books points, regrettably, to full enforcement of use-restrictive
TOU. 0 6
B. Potential Defenses to TOU
Attempts to enforce website TOU are susceptible to at least four
defenses. First, depending on how a TOU is presented to a user, and
to what extent a site requires and records any gesture of assent to the
terms, a user might argue that he or she never entered into a contract
at all with the TOU's proponent. Second, when the user's TOU
violating conduct implicates the exclusive rights afforded to content
owners by the Copyright Act, the user is positioned to argue that
federal law ought to preempt the site's contract claim under state law.
Third, a user might, as well, argue that the TOU are unconscionable.
Reference to contract formation principles, preemption, and
unconscionability defenses are common in the case law. 107 A fourth
defense, sounding in the First Amendment, has not been adjudicated
or considered by any court, but may serve as a useful surrogate and
constitutional backstop in contract cases, for which fair use is no
defense. I discuss these four defenses below.
1. Contract Formation.
The manner in which websites foist TOU upon users raises
litigable questions of contract formation - and specifically, whether
the user had sufficient notice of the proposed terms and agreed to
them. Questions like these have found their way to court since
software developers first propounded EULAs that purported to bind
end users upon opening the software's packaging, loading the
program, and using it. 08 These licenses came to be known as
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (software license agreement); and Davidson &
Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005) (Involving both EULA and TOU).
106. See generally Bowers, 320 F.3d 1317 (software license agreement); ProCD, 86 F.3d
1447 (software license agreement); Vault Corporation, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (software
license agreement); and Davidson & Assocs., 422 F.3d at 639 (Involving both EULA and TOU).
107. See generally Bowers, 320 F.3d 1317 (software license agreement); ProCD, 86 F.3d
1447 (software license agreement); Vault Corporation, 847 F.2d 255 (software license
agreement); and Davidson & Assocs., 422 F.3d at 639 (Involving both EULA and TOU); see
also Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (Cal. 2000).
108. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1241-42 (1995) ("Vendors intend that, by opening the plastic wrap and actually using the
2010]FREE EXPRESSION AND ONLINE TERMS OF USE 111
"shrinkwrap" licenses, after the practice of delivering the terms on a
sheet of paper sandwiched between the boxed software and its
transparent plastic wrapper.109 Courts without fail pronounced the
terms of such licenses unenforceable against users, until a Seventh
Circuit case, ProCD v. Zeidenbergil0 turned the tide."'
The defendant Zeidenberg raised the usual, anticipated defense
to breach of a shrinkwrap contract term: he argued that he never
agreed to the term when he purchased the software in question. In
rejecting this argument, Judge Easterbrook looked to the Uniform
Commercial Code - he noted that a vendor "may invite acceptance
by conduct," and "a buyer may accept by performing the acts the
vendor proposes to treat as acceptance." 1 l2 The buyer had "an
opportunity to read the license at his leisure," and if he found the
terms unacceptable, he could return the software - so long as he had
not used it first." Commentators immediately found fault with the
court's reasoning in ProCD,1l4 but the decision broke the seal on the
enforcement of shrinkwrap license terms, and at least as many courts
have upheld shrinkwrap terms since ProCD as have rejected them.s"5
Websites typically present TOU to users in one of two formats:
"clickwrap" or "browsewrap." A clickwrap site presents TOU to the
user and requires him or her to "click through," i.e., check a box
indicating that he or she agrees to the contract's terms.' 16 In these
cases, a website owner retains (or should retain) in its records
evidence that the user did see and affirmatively express assent to the
software, customers will bind themselves to the terms of the shrinkwrap license."); see also,
e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447 (considering whether a party could be bound by shrinkwrap terms
received after purchasing software); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d
Cir. 1991) (same).
109. Lemley, supra note 108, at 1241.
110. ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447.
111. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 468 (2006).
112. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
113. Id.
114. E.g., Robert J. Morrill, Comment, Contract Formation and the Shrink Wrap License:
A Case Comment on ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 32 NEw ENG. L. REv. 513, 515 (1998)
(concluding that the court's reasoning was "flawed," that the court "overlooked some
fundamentals of contract formation," and that it "should not be looked to as precedent" in
consumer retail transactions); Christopher L. Pitet, Comment, The Problem with "Money Now,
Terms Later": ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of "Shrinkwrap" Software
Licenses, 31 LOYOLA L. REV. 325, 340-47 (1997) ("A Contract Was Formed When Zeidenberg
Purchased the Software;" "The UCC Does Not Sanction 'Money Now, Terms Later'"; "The
Holding in ProCD Exploits the Consumer").
115. Lemley, supra note 111, at 469 & nn.34, 35 (collecting cases).
116. See Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 728-29 (N.D. Ohio 2007); Feldman
v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
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terms of use. A user's click-through is usually adequate to establish
that the user and the website proprietor formed a "contract" that
incorporates the terms of use.' 17 The enforceability of click-through
agreements is uncontroversial, but a click-through presentation can be
jarring to the user and disrupt a website's presentational flow.
The far more common method of presentation is to post the
terms on a separate web page, with a moderately descriptive link
("Legal," "Terms of Use," "Terms of Service," "Copyright Notice").
This "browsewrap" format does not require the user to make any
click-through gesture of assent to the terms,"' and websites prefer it
in part because it is unobtrusive and less likely to "scare away"
users.19 The terms are there for the user to review at his or her
discretion, but they purport to bind the user, whether or not he or she
actually bothers. Courts were initially reluctant to hold users to TOU
presented in this fashion. 120 The leading case on this side of the issue
was a 2002 decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Specht v.
Netscape Communications Corp.12 1 The Specht court wrote:
"Reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms
and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers
are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and
credibility."1 22
More recently cases have turned away from the strict notice-and-
assent requirements endorsed by the Specht court. In Register.com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,123 the plaintiff was a domain name registrar, and its
website enabled users to conduct "WHOIS" searches to acquire
information on web domain ownership. Register.com confronted
117. See, e.g., Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (holding that a customer's click-through
was sufficient to establish assent to a forum selection clause in a transaction conducted through
the defendant's website); Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp.
2d 756, 781-82 & n.14 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that Texas law supports enforcement of
clickwrap contracts); iLan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338
(D. Mass. 2002) ("i.LAN explicitly accepted the clickwrap license agreement when it clicked on
the box stating 'I agree."'); Forrest v. Verizon Comm'ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010 (D.C. 2002)
(enforcing a clickwrap forum selection clause).
118. Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 236 & n.l (citing James J. Tracy, Legal Update:
Browsewrap Agreements, Register.com v. Vario, Inc., II B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 164 (2005)).
119. Tracy, supra note 118, at 165.
120. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Comm'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2002);
Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (expressing reservations
about the enforceability of terms of use in a case where the terms were "not set forth on the
homepage" but "on a different web page that is linked to the homepage").
121. Specht, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
122. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
123. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
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users with its TOU after they completed searches. On this basis, the
Register.com court observed that the case was not strictly a
"browsewrap" case. There was no link to the TOU on the website,
and users did not seek out the terms at their discretion. As soon as the
user conducted a WHOIS search, the site presented the user with the
TOU. Thereafter, and for subsequent searches, the users were on
notice of the terms. The Second Circuit held Register.com's TOU
enforceable against a regular user of the site, as the evidence showed
that - at least after its first search - the site had presented the terms
to the defendant user.12 4 The Register.com court rejected the
defendant's argument that although it may have had notice of the
TOU, it never gave affirmative assent to them; notice of the terms and
a determination to proceed with the searches was sufficient.15
Subsequent cases have gone a step further to hold that a plaintiff
need not even prove actual notice of the terms. Simple notice that
TOU exist can be sufficient to form a contract between the website
and the user - even if the TOU are located on a separate web page
and the user does not actually visit that page to review them. 12 6 The
terms need only be "sufficiently conspicuous" that a user could
review them.12 7 In Druyan v. Jagger,128 the plaintiff sued the Rolling
Stones and Ticketmaster, an online ticketing agent, over the
cancellation of a concert.129 Ticketmaster raised as an affirmative
defense certain liability limitations contained in its website's terms of
use, 130 and the plaintiff countered that she lacked notice of the terms'
content and therefore could not be bound to them. The district court
held that although Druyan may not have seen the terms, it was enough
that they were available on the site for her to review, and she
manifested her assent to them by a click-through.'
124. Id. at 401 ("If Verio had submitted only one query, or even if it had submitted only a
few sporadic queries, that would give considerable force to its contention that it obtained the
WHOIS data without being conscious that Register intended to impose conditions, and without
being deemed to have accepted Register's conditions. But Verio was daily submitting numerous
queries, each of which resulted in its receiving notice of the terms Register exacted.").
125. Id. at 403.
126. Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1106-07 (C.D.
Cal. 2007).
127. Druyan v. Jagger, 508 F. Supp. 2d 228, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 232.
130. Id. at 237 ("The Terms of Use and the Concert ticket provided the plaintiff with
unequivocal notice that any concert or event was subject to the risk of rescheduling. Neither of
the contracts required defendants to notify ticketholders of such rescheduling within any specific
period of time prior to the concert.").
131. Id. (citing Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003
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Another case involving Ticketmaster, Ticketmaster L.L. C. v.
RMG Technologies, Inc.,13 2 supports a conclusion that a website
provides sufficient notice to users of contract terms simply by posting
a link to them in an appropriately conspicuous location. Ticketmaster
brought a number of claims against RMG Technologies for its
development and marketing of web crawling software that third
parties used to harvest concert information from Ticketmaster's
servers.133 One cause of action was breach of contract, predicated on
express prohibitions against automated crawlers in the website's
TOU. 134 The court approved Ticketmaster's breach of contract theory
in its grant of a preliminary injunction against the defendant. The
RMG Technologies court rebuffed the defendant's claim that it had no
notice of the terms:
Plaintiff has presented evidence showing that access to the website
is governed by specific Terms of Use, and that any person viewing
the website is put on notice of the Terms of Use. For example, the
ticketmaster.com homepage displays the following warning: "Use
of this website is subject to express Terms of Use which prohibit
commercial use of this site. By continuing past this page, you
agree to abide by these terms." The underlined phrase "Terms of
Use" is a hyperlink to the full Terms of Use; the same phrase
appears on almost every page of ticketmaster.com.135
As Ticketmaster had further demonstrated that the defendant had
accessed the site - if not necessarily the page containing the
terms - the court concluded that it had appropriate notice of the
terms.
Though it is probably too early to declare a consensus in the
courts on the question, 137 the Ticketmaster cases likely mark the
WL 21406289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003) (distinguishing Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns
Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002), on the ground that terms of use on the Ticketmaster site were
"plainly visible.").
132. Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (C.D. Cal.
2007).
133. Id. at 1102-03.
134. Id. at 1107.
135. Id. (citations omitted); see also Tickets.com, 2003 WL 21406289, at *2 ("The contract
aspect of the case derives from a notice placed on the home page of the TM web site which
states that anyone going beyond that point into the interior web pages of the web site accepts
certain conditions, which include, relevant to this case, that all information obtained from the
website is for the personal use of the user and may not be used for commercial purposes.").
136. Id.
137. In A. V. v. iParadigms, Ltd. Liab. Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), for
example, a district court held that the plaintiffs did not agree to an indemnification provision in
browsewrap TOU, in part because iParadigms offered no evidence that the plaintiffs ever saw
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tipping point in a trend favoring findings of contract formation. The
least one can say is that the case for formation now has a foothold in
the case reporters. And it is now a regular practice of commercial
sites posting browsewrap TOU to place links to the terms at the foot
of the website's home page, and quite often on every individual page
on the site.138 As time passes and more sites adopt this convention,
and the links subsist on these sites for a longer time, a user's
argument that he or she did not know where to find the term will
become less supportable. What a court rules, on balance, to be
"sufficiently conspicuous" today may not even require the balancing
tomorrow. If the history of shrinkwrap agreements is any guide,
browsewrap TOU will overcome the skepticism of courts by sheer
persistence: it is far safer, jurisprudentially, to ratify widespread
business practices than to invalidate them.139
2. Preemption.
Defendants have raised statutory and conflict preemption
defenses to contract claims that implicate the Copyright Act.
(a) Statutory Preemption
Section 301 of the Copyright Act contains a preemption
provision stating that "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright ... are governed exclusively by this title."140
Theoretically, a state law claim for breach of contract could be
them. See id. at 485 (citing Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004),
but not accounting for the Ticketmaster cases). It surely helped the plaintiffs cause that the
browsewrap TOU were proffered independently of a clickwrap agreement that the plaintiffs had
seen and accepted, and which the plaintiff could reasonably have believed to include all the
terms and conditions iParadigms meant to impose. Id. at 484-85.
138. See, e.g., ABC News Home Page, http://abcnews.go.com (link to "Terms of Use")
(last visited Jan. 23, 2009); eBay Home Page, http://www.ebay.com (link to "User Agreement")
(last visited Jan. 23, 2009); FindLaw Home Page, http://www.findlaw.com (link to "Terms")
(last visited Jan. 23, 2009); MSN.com Home Page, http://www.msn.com (link to "Legal") (last
visited Jan. 23, 2009).
139. Other formation frontiers still remain for websites and their users to explore. For
example, it is not yet clear to what extent a defendant can be held to be "on notice" that terms of
use exist when its automated software have accessed the site and terms of use are displayed to
the crawler, but not to any human being. The Internet Archive has raised this defense in Internet
Archive v. Shell, 505 F. Supp. 2d 755 (D. Colo. 2007), in which a website owner has brought
suit alleging, inter alia, that the Internet Archive breached terms of use that required users to
pay for copies of web pages. To this point the district court has not ruled on the extent to which
the Internet Archive entered into a contract with Ms. Shell simply by sending its crawler there.
Id. at 765-66.
140. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006).
116 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
subject to copyright preemption. Litigants have explored this
proposition, and by now it is generally accepted that the Copyright
Act does not preempt contract claims based on uses of content that
copyright law would tolerate. 14 1 Judge Easterbrook's disposition of
the preemption defense raised in ProCD v. Zeidenberg is the seminal
case on this question. The contract claims in ProCD arose out of an
end user license agreement that the plaintiff proffered as a condition
on use of copyrighted software by which the defendant would access
ProCD's proprietary databases. The defendant invited the court to
rejected the contract claim as preempted by the Copyright Act. The
court accepted arguendo that the databases were insufficiently
original to be copyrightable. 142 Although the databases in issue did
not fall within the scope of copyrightable material, the court
nonetheless concluded that for preemption purposes the Copyright
Act occupies a zone of subject matter that would include them:
One function of § 301(a) is to prevent states from giving special
protection to works of authorship that Congress has decided should
be in the public domain, which it can accomplish only if "subject
matter of copyright" includes all works of a type covered by
sections 102 and 103, even if federal law does not afford protection
to them. 143
On this basis, the court held that the defendant had cleared the first,
"subject matter" impediment to a preemption finding.
The court went on to rule, however, that the preemption defense
failed, on the ground that rights created by contract are not the sort of
"exclusive rights" that are comparable or competitive with those
conferred by copyright. "A copyright is a right against the world," the
court wrote. "Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their
parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create
'exclusive rights."'l 44 The court noted that this principle supports any
data repository's imposition of restrictions against wholesale
141. E.g., Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Most
courts have held that the Copyright Act does not preempt the enforcement of contractual rights."
(citing Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) ("[M]ost courts
to examine this issue have found that the Copyright Act does not preempt contractual constraints
on copyrighted articles."); and Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F.
Supp. 2d 756, 766 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (observing that a "majority of courts" have so ruled).
142. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
143. Id. at 1453 (noting that copyright "commentators" had reached consensus on this
point (citing 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 15.2.3 (2d ed. 2005); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2009); 2
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1108-09 (1994))).
144. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006)).
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reproduction of data by their customers: thus a user could not
cannibalize LEXIS's collection of public-domain judicial decisions in
order to create his own competitive (or cost-free) database. 145 The
ProCD court took care not to rule categorically that copyright law
cannot preempt a breach of contract claim, but it came close. The
Copyright Act does not vacate the premises upon simple incantation
of the word "contract" - the court wrote that "the variations and
possibilities are too numerous to foresee. . . . But general enforcement
of shrinkwrap licenses of the kind before us does not create such
interference."l 4 6
The ProCD position has some surface appeal, to be sure. The
imposition of restrictions on one contracted party hardly speaks to an
"exclusive" right. Moreover, the Copyright Act, like property law,
merely establishes a default setting of rights for parties to alter and
adjust by agreement. Just as an owner of real estate has the
prerogative to sell some or all of his or her bundle of property rights,
parties assigned a certain measure of copyrights or fair use privileges
by federal law ought to be able to bargain away those rights in an
enforceable agreement. Adopting ProCD's reasoning, the Federal
Circuit has observed that "[c]ourts respect freedom of contract and do
not lightly set aside freely-entered agreements."14 7 Thus although the
subsequent case law admits of the occasional exception,14 8 a
substantial majority of courts to consider the question have adopted
the ProCD position wholesale.149 Commentators have taken a dim
view of ProCD's pronouncements on the Copyright Act's limited
ability to preempt contractual arrangements.150 What is perhaps most
discouraging is that the court left for another day any consideration of
what contractual circumstances might warrant a finding of
preemption. Judge Easterbrook writes only that contracts do not
"generally" shrink before § 301, and the facts before it warranted no
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1455; see also id. at 1454 (observing that "Congress possesses power to
preempt even the enforcement of contracts about intellectual property").
147. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
148. See Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns., Inc., 266 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2001).
149. See Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005); Bowers,
320 F.3d at 1324.
150. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright's Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 387, 441-42 (2008) ("[B]oth a new interpretation of legal rules governing contract
formation and a narrowing of copyright's preemption doctrine proved no impediment to Judge
Easterbrook in his zeal to ensure ProCD's ability to price discriminate."); Moffat, supra note 45,
at 76 (observing that ProCD "reflects no effort by the court to determined or understand
congressional intent" vis-6-vis the Copyright Act).
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exception - hence no precise articulation of when copyright
preemption should, if ever, trigger. And still this omission would not
in itself be cause for concern, had not subsequent courts charged with
considering the cases that ProCD could not "foresee" tended simply
to apply ProCD's holding without further analysis.15 1
To its credit, the Sixth Circuit, in Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell
Corp.,52  did articulate a standard for finding contract claims
preempted by § 301; that standard, however, is unavailing to defeat
website TOU that restrict copyright law-approved uses. The Wrench
court cited Nimmer's treatise in support of a proposition that the
Copyright Act would preempt a contractual claim predicated on a
simple promise not to engage in conduct that would describe
infringement of a copyrighted work. '5 By the minority
Nimmer/Wrench rule, a breach of contract claim must "allege[] more
than reproduction, adaptation, etc. simpliciter of a copyrighted
work." l54 The Wrench court acknowledged that the reach of this rule
is extremely limited - it will rarely be the case that a plaintiff cannot
point to an additional element in a breach of contract claim. A
defendant's promise to pay to use the plaintiffs copyrighted work
will be enough to defeat preemption.'" The Wrench court ultimately
did reject the preemption argument, even after rejecting ProCD's
much narrower view of preemption.' 6
The difference between Wrench's "additional promise" standard
and what guidance one can discern from ProCD is that Wrench would
preempt contract claims based on conduct that would otherwise be
actionable as copyright infringement, and ProCD would not. 5 Both
courts would have upheld the contract in ProCD that imposed copy
151. See Moffat, supra note 45, at 76-77 (describing ProCD's preemption holding as
"extremely influential" and cited by the "vast majority of cases concerning § 301 preemption of
contracts"); id. at 102 (critiquing courts' "rote reference to precedent" in this context).
152. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001).
153. Id. at 457-58 ("If the promise amounts only to a promise to refrain from reproducing,
performing, distributing or displaying the work, then the contract claim is preempted.").
154. Id. at 457 (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 144, § 1.01[B][1][a], at 1-15 to -
16) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id. at 458 (citing Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988)
(so holding), and Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same).
156. Id. at 457-58. The Wrench court wrote specifically: "[W~e do not embrace the
proposition that all state law contract claims survive preemption simply because they involve the
additional element of promise." Id. at 457 & n.6 (citing ProCD for this broader proposition
while conceding, in a footnote, ProCD's recitation that certain unforeseeable circumstances
might call for preemption of contractual terms).
157. See id. at 457-58.
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restrictions on an uncopyrightable database. The ProCD/ Wrench
distinction is likewise immaterial to the case in which the owner of
web content seeks to enforce website TOU against a visitor who
makes a fair or otherwise statutorily privileged use of the content.
Even under Wrench's "additional promise" standard, copyright law
will not preempt a contract between content purveyor 58 and content
user, in which the user agrees to waive some or all of his or her
statutorily privileged uses. The user has made a promise, and the
promise is not simply to refrain from infringement but rather the
privilege to engage in legal, noninfringing uses. That additional
concession takes the contract out of the zone of exclusive governance
of the Copyright Act.
The Federal Circuit's ruling in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies,
Inc.159 is illustrative. The plaintiff in Bowers sought enforcement of a
EULA that strictly prohibited reverse-engineering of the software at
issue. The court recognized that copyright law protects a limited
amount of reverse engineering of software as fair use. 6 o Applying
First Circuit law, and relying heavily on ProCD, the Bowers court
held that "the First Circuit would find that private parties are free to
contractually forego the limited ability to reverse engineer a software
product under the exemptions of the Copyright Act."161
A dissenting judge in Bowers elected to confront the elephant in
the room. Judge Dyk would have applied a preemption standard
borrowed from the patent cases more familiar in the Federal Circuit:
the Copyright Act should preempt any enforcement of state law that
"substantially impedes the public use of the otherwise unprotected
material."162 The contract before the Bowers court was not the result
of arms-length bargaining, nor was there evidence to reflect that the
defendant obtained value in exchange for waiving the right to make
158. Here and elsewhere I use the term "content purveyor," and not "content owner,"
because contractual provisions may allow their proponents to impose use restrictions on content
in which they own no copyrights at all, as in ProCD, where the plaintiffs had no copyrights in
the factual contents of its database.
159. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
160. Id. at 1325 (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843
(Fed. Cir. 1992). Bowers took care not to disturb that principle with its holding. Id. at 1325 ("In
making this determination, this court has left untouched the conclusions reached in Atari Games
v. Nintendo regarding reverse engineering as a statutory fair use exception to copyright
infringement.").
161. Id. at 1325-26.
162. Id. at 1335 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157, 167 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Copyright law, like
patent law, after all, means to strike a balance between proprietary rights and public use.
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noninfringing use of the software. The defendant bought the software,
and it arrived on his doorstep with a shrinkwrap license that laid down
the condition against reverse engineering, and "Like any other
contract of adhesion, the only choice offered to the purchaser is to
avoid making the purchase in the first place. State law thus gives the
copyright holder the ability to eliminate the fair use defense in each
and every instance at its option:16 3
Judge Dyk went on to note that if one accepts the majority's
holding in Bowers, "there is no logical stopping point" for unilateral
contractual bans on uses that the Copyright Act otherwise sets aside
for the public, including the first sale doctrine.'"
This is the crux of it: the delicate balancing that Congress and
the courts have undertaken with respect to copyrights comes to
nothing if state contract law empowers content purveyors to impose
their own rewrites of the law on consumers. Commentators have
rightly applauded Judge Dyk's insights1 6 5 and regarded the majority
opinion in Bowers as a reckless extension of the ProCD decision.
David Nimmer suggests that courts will ultimately reverse the no-
preemption momentum and "vindicat[e]" the Bowers dissent. 67
Nimmer points to a more recent decision in the Federal Circuit,
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylnk Technologies, Inc.,16 8 in which the
court "reacted violently" at the plaintiffs proposal, "through a
combination of contractual terms and technological measures, to
repeal the fair use doctrine with respect to an individual copyrighted
work."l 6 9 "Such reasoning" Nimmer projects, "moves inexorably"
163. Id. at 1337 (citation omitted); see also id. at 1336 ("If state law provided that a
copyright holder could bar fair use of the copyrighted material by placing a black dot on each
copy of the work offered for sale, there would be no question but that the state law would be
preempted.").
164. Id. at 1337. Judge Dyk highlights the first sale doctrine, but of course this limitation
on copyright was by the time of Bowers a longtime casualty of the software licensing
distribution model.
165. E.g., Bryan Seigworth, Injuring Competition and Impeding the Progress of Science:
Why Bowers v. Baystate Technologies Was Wrongly Decided, 23 J.L. & COM. 205, 227 (2004)
(referring to Judge Dyk's dissenting opinion as a "bright spot"); David A. Rice, Copyright and
Contract: Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 595, 602-03
(2004) (describing the dissenting opinion as "vigorously and soundly argued").
166. E.g., Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An "Idea"
Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 772 (2006) (suggesting that the ProCD and
Bowers courts may have "too easily upheld state contract law in the shrinkwrap context").
167. David Nimmer, Promises! Promises!, 119 HARv. L. REV. F. 74, 81 (2006), availible
at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/ 19/janO6/nimmer.pdf.
168. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
169. Nimmer, supra note 167, at 81 (quoting Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1202
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1202 ("Copyright
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toward a repudiation of the Bowers holding.17 0 The sea change
Nimmer promises has not yet arrived, however. Meanwhile, the "vast
majority" of cases in the reporters reject § 301 preemption of state
contract law,"' and use restrictions continue to proliferate and grow
more entrenched on the Internet.
(b) Conflict Preemption
Where the protections of § 301's preemption provision fall short,
a party confronting a contract claim might still assert the defense of
conflict preemption, as the defendant did in Davidson & Associates v.
Jung.172 The defense of conflict preemption is available "when
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."' 7 3 One would expect the latter condition to be established
when a content purveyor conditions access to content on the user's
acceptance of restrictions on uses that the Copyright Act would
permit. Surely a state statute that restricted fair or otherwise
privileged uses of copyrighted content - or that broadened the scope
of content subject to copyright protection - could not but be held
preempted on the ground that it subverted the carefully considered
balancing of proprietary rights and public prerogative that Congress
has written in Title 17 of the U.S. Code.174
In 1988, in Vault Corporation v. Quaid Software Ltd.,175 the
Fifth Circuit in fact invalidated a state law, the Louisiana Software
law itself authorizes the public to make certain uses of copyrighted materials. . . What the law
authorizes, Chamberlain cannot revoke.").
170. Nimmer, supra note 167, at 81.
171. Id. at 77 (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 143, § 1.01[B][1][a][iii], at 1-23 to
-24).
172. Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2005).
173. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
174. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 709-11 (1984)
(invalidating a state law restricting television advertisements of alcoholic beverages on the
ground that the law disturbed a compulsory copyright licensing scheme enacted by Congress to
support national cable television broadcasts). At issue in Capital Cities Cable was a very narrow
indulgence (paid compulsory licenses) that Congress afforded to a very narrow constituency
(cable television systems) under the Copyright Act. Broader statutory assaults on public
privileges at the core of the copyright scheme ought to trigger much more intense conflict
preemption scrutiny from courts.
175. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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License Enforcement Act ("LSLEA"),176 that treated certain software
license terms specified in the law as enforceable on users so long as
the licenses met certain procedural requirements.177 The terms
approved by statute included "the prohibition of: (1) any copying of
the program for any purpose; and (2) modifying and/or adapting the
program in any way, including adaptation by reverse engineering,
decompilation or disassembly.""' The plaintiff in Vault brought
copyright infringement and contract claims and invoked the LSLEA
in support of the contract claims, arguing that the license restrictions
on all copying and reverse engineering, regardless of whether these
uses were privileged uses under the Copyright Act, satisfied all the
LSLEA conditions and should be enforced. The Court of Appeals
held the LSLEA preempted on the ground that restrictions on reverse
engineering "conflict[ed] with the rights of computer program
owners" under the Copyright Act.17 9
The Fifth Circuit glossed over the question whether the state
contract law on its own would support enforcing the licensing
provisions that conflicted with federal copyright laws. It simply ruled
that, without the assistance of the LSLEA, the contract language was
unenforceable.' 80 The Fifth Circuit noted in passing that trial court
had declared the license agreement "a contract of adhesion which
could only be enforceable if the [LSLEA] is a valid and enforceable
statute."' 8 1 This fact presumably supplied the basis for the Fifth
Circuit's proceeding from its preemption holding to its ruling that the
software license was unenforceable.1 82
The defendants in Davidson & Associates, 183 cited Vault in
support of their conflict preemption appeal. The Eighth Circuit
rejected the argument. The state law at issue in Davidson was bare
contract law: there was no statute analogous to the LSLEA that
rendered the TOU binding and enforceable. The Court of Appeals
emphasized that the defendants "contractually accepted restrictions on
176. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1961-:1966 (2003).
177. Vault, 847 F.2d at 269-70.
178. Id. at 268-69.
179. Id. at 270.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 269 (quoting Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 761
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
182. See id. at 270 ("For this reason, and the reasons set forth by the district court, we
hold that at least this provision of Louisiana's License Act is preempted by federal law, and thus
that the restriction in Vault's license agreement against decompilation or disassembly is
unenforceable." (emphasis added)).
183. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2005).
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their ability to reverse engineer by their agreement to the TOU and
EULA."l8 4 Citing Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., the court
ruled that the defendants "expressly relinquished their rights to
reverse engineer."185 The court nowhere considered whether the terms
were imposed unilaterally and without negotiation.' 86 Although the
plaintiff presented its restrictive TOU in an adhesive clickwrap
format - so that the access that it necessarily a precondition to
reverse engineer was conditioned on accepting a restriction on that
use - both the trial court' and appeals court in Davidson &
Associates embraced the fiction that users traded away or waived their
reverse-engineering rights for value.
The Davidson & Associates courts fairly read Vault's invocation
of conflict preemption to apply only to the LSLEA's enforceability
charm and not to the enforceability of use-restrictive EULAs
themselves. That is, the Vault court never considered that the specific
contractual provisions before it could be preempted by copyright law.
It never rejected this proposition, either. The Vault court simply
invalidated the statute that would have affirmed such provisions over
defenses of unenforceability; from there it ruled the license terms
before the court unenforceable because they were contracts of
adhesion.' 8 8 The court arguably never reached the question of conflict
preemption of the contractual terms, because they were
unconscionable in any event. The Fifth Circuit in Davidson &
Associates was asked to consider that particular question, and it
punted - even though the effect of the decision was to enforce state
contract law in a manner that would entitle any content purveyor to
impose use-restrictive TOU that disturb delicate balance copyright
law has struck between proprietary and public use interests.
3. Unconscionability.
A third defense against restrictive terms of use is
unconscionability - that is, that the contract terms are so unfairly
imposed that to enforce them would offend public policy.
Conclusions regarding unconscionability may vary from one state to
184. Id. at 639.
185. Id. (citing 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
186. As I will discuss below, the district court had already held that the TOU were not
unconscionable, under California law. Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F.
Supp. 2d 1164, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
187. The district court, too, cited Bowers with approval and rejected Vault as inapposite.
Id. at 1181.
188. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1988).
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the next, 89 but the mode of analysis is consistent nationwide: courts
review contract terms for "procedural" and "substantive"
unconscionability. 190 Procedural unconscionability turns on the extent
to which the contract's terms are offered as standard and non-
negotiable, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, by a party with "superior
bargaining strength."' 9' The substantive element concerns the fairness
of the terms.19 2 Courts may enforce such contracts of adhesion only if
their terms are not overly burdensome on the offeree. Conversely, a
freely-negotiated contract term that is gravely one-sided may be held
unenforceable as well. Courts apply a "sliding scale"
unconscionability standard, by which courts "disregard[] the
regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation ... in
proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the
substantive terms themselves."' 93 As Williston writes, "the more
substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of
procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion
that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa." 94
Defendants have raised unconscionability defenses to contract
claims predicated on website TOU, with mixed results. Class action
waivers and arbitration clauses in online clickwrap purchase
agreements have been ruled unconscionable under California law.'95
Applying Texas law, an Illinois state court ruled that an online
189. Compare, e.g., Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (finding
class action waivers presented in contracts of adhesion to be inconsistent with California public
policy and therefore substantively unconscionable in that state), with, e.g., AutoNation USA
Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 199-200 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding class action waivers in
arbitration clauses not substantively unconscionable).
190. See, e.g., Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006)
(applying California law); Gilman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y.
1988); Salley v. Option One Mortage Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 119-20 (Pa. 2007) ("[A] contract or
term is unconscionable, and therefore avoidable, where there was a lack of meaningful choice in
the acceptance of the challenged provision and the provision unreasonably favors the party
asserting it.").
191. Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172-73 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Bess
v. DirecTV, Inc., 885 N.E.2d 488, 495-96 (111. App. Ct. 2008).
192. Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1172-73.
193. 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1763A (3d ed. 1972); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24
Cal. 4th 83, 114 (Cal. 2000); see also Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 111 (N.J.
2006).
194. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114 (Cal. 2000).
195. See Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. C 07-03967 MHP, 2008 WL 618988, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 4, 2008); Brazil v. Dell Inc., No. C-07-01700 RMW, 2007 WL 2255296, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 3, 2007); Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 612 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(applying California law).
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"Terms and Conditions of Sale" agreement containing an arbitration
provision and class action waiver was not unconscionable -
notwithstanding that the Terms were not "conspicuous" to the user.196
A federal district court in Ohio ruled last year that a website's
disclaimers of warranties and liability limitations, presented in a
clickwrap format, were neither procedurally nor substantively
unconscionable. 197 A clickwrap agreement's forum selection clause
was held not unconscionable.19 8
Only one case to date has considered the question whether a
website TOU's restrictions on the use of copyrighted content are
unconscionable. Applying California law, the trial court in Davidson
& Associates, Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc. rejected the
unconscionability defense. 199 As I have noted above, the TOU at
issue in the Davidson case barred the user from reverse-engineering
Internet Gateway's video game software - a use that the court
recognized as fair under copyright law. 2 0 0 The district court ruled first
that the contract was not procedurally unconscionable, because (1)
other, competing video games were available to the defendants to use;
(2) the defendants were "not unwitting members of the general
public," but "computer programmers and administrators familiar with
the language used in the contract; (3) the contract terms were "no
surprise" to the defendants, who had notice of them before accessing
the video game; and (4) the website afforded the defendants thirty
days to review the terms and reject them.201
The court's recitation of these mitigating facts might have
offered a blueprint for future litigants to distinguish the Davidson &
Associates TOU from the now-standard browsewrap formats that
immediately and irrevocably bind users to refrain from making
otherwise lawful use of their content. Website TOU more often than
not bind "the general public" (as did the TOU in Davidson &
Associates, for that matter) and in many instances are never presented
to users. These facts might have provided a basis for distinguishing
the Davidson & Associates holding, except that the court ruled that
the terms were not substantively unconscionable, either, as they were
not so "harsh or oppressive," "so one-sided as to 'shock the
196. See Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 123-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
197. See Doe v. Sexsearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 734-36 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
198. See Feldman v. Google, 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 239-43 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
199. Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178-80
(E.D. Mo. 2004).
200. Id. at 1180 ("Reverse engineering as a fair use is firmly established.").
201. Id. at 1179-80.
126 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
conscience."'202 The defendants appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, where it raised the defense of conflict preemption. 203 The
appellants did not seek review of the district court's rulings on
unconscionability.
The case law on shrinkwrap and other software end user license
agreements is surprisingly devoid of unconscionability analysis. Early
on, when courts were inclined to hold shrinkwrap licenses and
EULAs unenforceable, they tended to do so on the ground that the
user had bought a copy of the software outright - so that there was
no license agreement to review for unconscionability. 204 The ProCD
decision marked a turning point in the courts' treatment of these
agreements. As courts came to accept the license model of software
distribution, they were finally positioned to consider a defense that a
license agreement's terms might be unconscionable. By this time,
shrinkwrap and clickwrap practices have grown so entrenched in the
industry that courts have proved reluctant to pull the trigger on
unconscionability rulings. 205 Thus, although one would expect cries of
unconscionability to have been a familiar refrain of defendants in
cases to enforce EULAs, courts have written very little in this area.
Davidson is the only case that opines on the question whether TOU
that restrict fair and other uses privileged by the Copyright Act are
unconscionable. That single district court decision does not foreclose
more encouraging developments in other courts - particularly as it
only applied Missouri law - but to this point, unconscionability is a
losing argument.
4. The First Amendment.
In Eldred v. Ashcroft206 the Supreme Court ruled that there is no
separate, collateral First Amendment defense against a copyright
claim. 207 The Court held that the "idea/expression dichotomy" and
fair use doctrine grant expressive indulgences to would-be speakers
sufficient to satisfy the command of the First Amendment. The
protections of copyright law - and conversely, its restrictions on
202. Id. at 1180.
203. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 637 (8 Cir. 2005).
204. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 97 n.1 1 (3d Cir. 1991).
205. E.g., Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (rejecting an unconscionability defense to a EULA); Davidson & Assocs., 334
F. Supp. 2d at 1179-80; M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 315
(Wash. 2000).
206. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
207. Id. at 218-21.
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expression - only extend to the rightsholder's original creations.208
"[E]very idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes
instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of
publication" of a copyrighted work.2 09 And through fair use, the
public can even make limited use of the protected creative content. 2 10
By implication, then, the Court views these doctrinal carve-outs from
copyright to be at least as protective as the First Amendment would
require without them - and possible more so. 2 11
A defendant cannot, of course, plead fair use (or the
idea/expression dichotomy or any other statutory privilege set forth in
the Copyright Act) as a defense to a breach of contract claim. Where a
content purveyor seeks to enforce a contractual term that limits a
user's ability to utter the owned content, the same First Amendment
values are implicated as in a copyright infringement claim, but the fair
use vehicle is not available to carry them forward. It seems
appropriate, then, that a user could assert a First Amendment defense
to any content purveyor's gesture at obtaining judicial enforcement of
a contractual term to enjoin or seek damages for the user's expression.
What the nature of that constitutional defense may be, and how courts
would apply it, is unclear. The Eldred Court did make clear that the
First Amendment "bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to
make other people's speeches."2 12
The Court's "bears less heavily" dictum might suggest a less
rigorous standard of review than the "strict scrutiny" that is routine in
First Amendment cases - perhaps the intermediate scrutiny that
courts apply to regulatory schemes targeted at commercial speech. 2 13
It is not obvious that a strict or intermediate scrutiny model is
appropriate for this context, where the court does not confront a
speech-burdening act of the elected branches, but it is instead
reviewing a civil claim, the adjudication of which implicates the First
208. Id. at 219 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) and Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
209. Id. at 219 (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991)).
210. Id. at 219 ("[T]he 'fair use' defense allows the public to use not only facts and ideas
contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances.").
211. The Eldred Court did leave itself some wiggle-room here, as it noted that
"copyright's built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address" First
Amendment concerns. Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
212. Id. at 221.
213. See, e.g., Centerline Equip. Corp. v. Banner Pers. Serv., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 768,
773 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
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Amendment through the court's action.214 It seems analytically
awkward to consider to what extent a plaintiffs TOU advance any
government interest, whether substantial or compelling. Whether
enforcement of the TOU advances a government interest - and
whether such enforcement might be narrowly tailored or reasonably
calculated to accomplish that interest - seems a more appropriate
question, but in most caseS215 there would be no government party to
weigh in on the point. The court's task would be to balance society's
interest in enforcing contracts against the free expression values that
the contract puts at risk. Is the enforcement interest "substantial"
enough? Is the TOU's impact on expression sufficiently contained to
survive strict or intermediate scrutiny? For that matter, does the
challenged use look enough like "making other people's speeches" to
call for something less than strict First Amendment scrutiny?
These questions might lure a court into conducting something
like an unconscionability analysis, with its attendance to public policy
(supporting enforcement of contracts and disfavoring speech
restrictions) and the onerousness of the contract terms at issue. Or a
court might hit upon the screamingly obvious answer: to conduct a
fair use inquiry. As the Eldred Court observed, after all, fair use is the
time-honored methodology for adjudicating the competing interests of
owned content and free expression. 2 16 The four factors can get at the
question whether the user was "making other people's speeches" or
simply fashioning that other speech into his or her own. They can
surely inform a court's balancing of the parties' respective interests,
and they incorporate considerations that key specifically on the
214. Cf., e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-71 (1964) (fashioning
a heightened intent requirement for common law defamation claims, in order to reconcile them
to the First Amendment). As Eugene Volokh observes:
The Court's First Amendment cases don't just set forth substantive rules, such as
the exceptions to First Amendment protection. They also set forth procedural
rules that help ensure that speech restrictions don't inadvertently suppress
protected speech as well as the unprotected. Libel and obscenity, for instance, fall
within exceptions to First Amendment protection; but libel and obscenity law
must still comply with these "[F]irst [A]mendment due process" rules. Likewise,
speech that infringes a copyright falls within the copyright exception - but
copyright law must comply with these procedural rules, too.
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44
Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUSTON L. REv. 697, 718 (2003).
215. Conceivably, a government could sue to enforce its website TOU in a way that
burdens free expression. See supra note 51 (describing the use-restrictive TOU on state
government websites). Indeed, one could imagine federal entities taking back by contract the
proprietary rights that the Copyright Act denies them as creators. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
216. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-220.
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property and expressive interests that are in opposition. That the
rights of the content "owner" are established by contract, and not the
Copyright Act, should not materially affect the constitutional analysis.
It may be the case that fair use is constitutionally
overprotective - that the doctrine surely satisfies the First
Amendment, but still reaches further to accomplish a specific
statutory objective: i.e., beyond protecting free expression from
infringement actions, fair use affirmatively promotes the creative of
creative work. Perhaps something less than the full range of fair uses
would pass constitutional muster. But fair use is what we have, and it
would not be unprecedented for courts to "overprotect" a
constitutional value in their holdings. Courts enforce the Miranda
doctrine as a constitutional matter, absent any underlying Fifth
Amendment 'violation.2 17 And in the First Amendment context,
specifically, the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth authorize a
court to invalidate a speech regulation on its face, even when the
regulation would be constitutional as applied to its challenger.2 18
Indeed, the facial invalidation cases reflect the Court's determination
that the First Amendment cries out for more "breathing space" 219 than
other constitutional values. 2 20  A constitutional defense that is
congruent with fair use may be "strong medicine" 221 in the contract
context - stronger even than the First Amendment requires - but
217. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-32, 444 (2000) (upholding the
Miranda rule as constitutionally required to protect against involuntary confessions,
notwithstanding the "disadvantage" that "statements which may be by no means involuntary ...
may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result").
218. E.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870-74 (1997) (vagueness);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-17 (1973) (overbreadth).
219. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12.
220. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 870-71 (finding a statute's vagueness problematic under
the First Amendment, but not necessarily the Fifth). Of course, the animating principle to facial
challenges under the First Amendment is that vague and overbroad regulations "chill" lawful,
protected speech. E.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612. It bears noting that the Eldred holding, that
fair use vindicates First Amendment values against copyright, is unsatisfying precisely because
fair use is such a case-specific, unpredictable proposition. One can generally never be sure his or
her use of copyrighted content is fair, until a judge has passed on the question. The Supreme
Court, for its part, holds its First Amendment doctrines to a less exacting standard of clarity and
predictability than it commands of the political branches - perhaps because they do not
describe the boundary between legal and illegal expression per se, so much as they distinguish
between protected speech and speech left to the government to regulate. Compare Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-26 (1973) (setting forth the legal standard for obscenity), with Reno,
521 U.S. at 870-73 (facially invalidating a provision of the Communications Decency Act on
vagueness grounds notwithstanding the government's argument that Congress modeled it on the
Miller test).
221. Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999).
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this is no basis for ruling it out in favor of a less suitable legal
standard that provides little guidance to courts.
But courts may not even get to this point. As we have seen in the
preemption cases, parties can freely bargain away uses of content that
22
are lawful under copyright law. The fact that some of those uses
might have constitutional protection makes them no less waivable.
Courts generally accept that a party can contract away constitutional
rights. Criminal courts accept plea bargains, by which criminal
defendants agree to waive their rights to confront and cross-examine
accusers and to a jury trial.223 The right of free expression does not
get special treatment, either: there are myriad contexts in which courts
enforce freely-negotiated contractual restrictions on expression. One
classic example is the nondisclosure or confidentiality agreement,
which by its very definition imposes restrictions on a party's free
expression.2 24 Agreements to settle litigation routinely contain this
sort of restriction, along with potentially other restrictions on
communication.225 Indeed, the fundamental obligation of an
agreement to settle a copyright claim may be a promise not to
distribute or display expressive matter - in many instances, the
settling defendant agrees to refrain from conduct that was never ruled
to be infringing or unlawful. No court would adopt a First
Amendment defense that would undermine these arrangements.
Courts ought to take a different view when a contractual
restriction on expression is imposed without negotiation. The
customary uniformly-presented click-through and browsewrap TOU
that condition access to content on the user's acquiescence to severe
restrictions on use are hard to characterize as instances of a voluntary
waiver or exchange of an expressive right for value. It is true that the
user's statutory privileges under the Copyright Act do not guarantee
222. See supra Section III.A.2.
223. See FED. R. CRIM. P. II (authorizing defendants to enter into plea agreements and
requiring judges to enumerate in open courts the constitutional rights the defendant waives in
taking a plea).
224. See, e.g., Harsco Corp. v. Piontek, Civil No. 3:07-0633, 2008 WL 686217, at *12
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2008) ("It is certainly in the public interest to enforce confidentiality
agreements [pertaining to trade secrets] and to punish those who violate them and those who
secure the violation of those agreements.").
225. See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dor6, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of
Confidentiality in the Pursuit ofSettlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 283, 385-89 (1999); see
also, e.g., William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility
in High Technology, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 70 (2001) ("Employers frequently require [high tech]
employees to execute nondisclosure agreements, which impose continuing confidentiality
obligations ... . Nondisclosure agreements are usually enforceable without much fanfare.").
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unfettered access to a work (for starters, he or she may be required to
pay for it), but access to content is necessarily a precondition to
use. 2 26 If we accept, as courts have written in copyright cases, that
some limited use of others' original content is necessary to fuel a new
generation of expression, the exchange of that limited use for first-
instance access to the content is an empty sale.227 Attempts to enforce
nonnegotiable click-through or browsewrap terms that restrict
expressive use228 of content on a website, agreement to which is
imposed (or assumed) as a precondition to accessing the content on,
ought to be subjected to constitutional review in some form, whether
or not it be a reimportation of copyright's fair use doctrine.
Enforcement of these terms is less an endorsement of freedom of
contract principles than a judicial ratification of rights asserted by fiat.
IV. A "FREELY NEGOTIATED" TEST
So we find courts trending in favor of enforcement of online use
restrictions, notwithstanding that the Copyright Act might accept
some of the restricted uses as crucial to the promotion of future
creative works, and that the uses themselves very often entail
expression that might otherwise be protected by the First Amendment.
The Bowers court enforced an end user license agreement against a
user's fair use of the plaintiffs software. The Davidson court brought
that logic online and enforced a similar provision in website TOU,
against the same fair use. When the time comes that other website
owners invite a court to enforce personal use-only restrictions of web
content - perhaps against defendants' reverse engineering of the
site's software, as in Davidson and Bowers, or perhaps against
defendants' critical or scholarly reference to the content in question
- courts will confront a body of law that affirms the principle that
lawful uses of content can be freely bargained away. Copyright law
should not preempt such an arrangement, the unconscionability
226. Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns., Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1312 (1lth Cir. 2001) ("[O]btaining
access to a work is a necessary condition to copying it."). The Lipscher court held a contract
claim to be preempted by the Copyright Act when it was based on an exchange of access to
copyrighted material for a promise not to make use of it.
227. There may be instances in which the same content is made otherwise accessible at a
reasonable market price, but the content owner offers a discounted price in exchange for a
purchaser's waiver of lawful uses of it. In such cases it may be fair to treat the user as having
bargained away expressive rights. See infra Part IV. The common one-size-fits-all terms of
website contracts of adhesion do not fit this description.
228. A First Amendment defense to contract liability might not be available when the
defendant's copyright-approved use is not, strictly speaking, expressive - as when the
challenged use is reverse-engineering, or copying for search-engine indexing.
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doctrine should not be lightly invoked to supersede it, and the First
Amendment should not insist on protecting speech that the speaker
has sworn off by contractual agreement. These sound like the right
results.
But surely an exception is warranted when the bargaining is not
really "free," and when the practical effect of a uniformly, unilaterally
imposed, nonnegotiable use restriction is to augment its proponent's
copyrights by abrogating the fair use and other statutory privileges of
everyone who accesses the content. It is this paradigm that has
emerged to govern content purveyor/content user relationships on the
Internet - and unsurprisingly so. 2 29  Consider the most
straightforward case: online-only content protected by a browsewrap
"personal use-only" restriction. These TOU declare the sort of "rights
against the world" that should trigger a preemption defense to their
enforcement - if not statutory preemption, then the frustration-of-
legislative-intent strain of conflict preemption.230 To be sure, the
website's rights are established by a contract to which only the
content purveyor and the individual user are parties. But the same
contract is replicated across the range of users, and when aggregated
together, the gathered corpus of uniform contracts of adhesion
amounts to a declaration of rights by fiat - and these rights are at
odds with the reckoning of Congress and the courts on how best to
promote the production of creative works.2 31  Under these
229. See Madison, supra note 77, at 1113 (suggesting, in 1998, that "recent scholarship
fairly persuades" that ProCD's vision of market-based model, in which users barter statutory
privileges for value, will fail for lack of competition to supply licensed uses. ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)). Judge Easterbrook envisioned that ProCD's "rivals"
in the market "may elect to compete by offering superior software, monthly updates, improved
terms of use, lower price, or a better compromise among these elements." Id (quoting ProCD,
86 F.3d at 1453 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the content at issue in ProCD was
part of the public domain, competing vendors were at least in a position to offer the same
content on different terms. Where the content is original and subject to copyright, and the
additional contractual rights would limit fair uses of that content, the market does not hold out
the prospect of aiding the fair user. If Blogger X wants to excerpt a recent post of Blogger Y's in
order to critique Y's argument, it does not help that Blogger Z has more permissive TOU
governing his content.
230. Moffat, supra note 45, at 102 ("The ubiquity of super-copyright provisions
transforms them from instances of private ordering into exclusive rights against the world.");
Madison, supra note 77, at 1127-30 (describing this phenomenon as "private legislation").
231. Theoretically, of course, there is another universe of persons who do not access the
content and are therefore not bound to these restrictions on use - but because access is a
precondition to use, use by these persons, though not barred by contract, is not possible.
Circumstances might permit a user to access a website's content via a third party, i.e., without
ever visiting the website and succumbing to its TOU. These circumstances would only occur if
the website owner let its enforcement program lapse, as the third party that visits the website and
redistributes its content would be acting in violation of the personal use-only mandate. The
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circumstances an unconscionability defense should, too, get traction
with a court, as the terms are unilaterally imposed 2 32 in a manner that
runs counter to public policy - again, as reflected in federal law's
apportionment of proprietary rights and public privileges through the
Copyright Act. And finally, the enforcement of use-restrictive TOU,
for which the defendant never bargained, may amount to a judicial
injunction against protected expression.23 3
There is a point of convergence here, where a court could
conceivably apply any or all of the three defenses enumerated above,
once the "freely-negotiated" impediment is cleared. It is worth
pausing to consider the relative merits of the three defenses and what
might be gained or lost by choosing one over another. Because
unconscionability is a matter of state law, courts might reach different
conclusions from one jurisdiction to another. Mitigating this concern
somewhat is the fact that it is a national "public policy" - i.e.,
Congress's and the federal courts' determinations on what uses of
another's content ought to be privileged - that would be undermined
by the terms argued as unconscionable. Courts in the fifty states ought
to arrive at the same answer, but website TOU proponents would (in
theory, anyway) have fifty opportunities to litigate the question. The
free expression defense is more limited in its applicability, as it only
adheres when the restricted but privileged use subject to suit is
expressive in nature. One could argue, for example, that restrictions
on reverse-engineering software, such as those at issue in Bowers and
Davidson, do not implicate the First Amendment any more than a
government regulation would that prohibited the same practice.234
browsewrap TOU restrictions otherwise impose an airtight lockdown on otherwise legal uses.
232. Indeed, browsewrap agreements are more than contracts of adhesion, which the
offeree is at least empowered to accept or reject, if not negotiate. Browsewrap pronouncements
are instantly binding on anyone who accesses content on the website. The user does not need to
have reviewed the terms. The most substantial rejection the user can accomplish is to leave the
site promptly and never return. As to the content he or she accessed there, the user is still bound
by contract not to make unapproved use of it.
233. The constitutional defense assumes that the restricted uses do not fall outside the zone
of First Amendment protection for other reasons, e.g., because they are obscene.
234. For the same reason - that the use restrictions did not implicate expressive
conduct - the courts in Bowers and Davidson may have had fewer qualms about enforcing the
contracts over the preemption and unconscionability defenses that the defendants did raise. One
can argue that the case law is now so hospitable to the enforcement of EULA provisions and
TOU because the terms courts have seen, (e.g., restrictions on reverse-engineering) and the
conduct plaintiffs have sued over, (e.g., competitor websites' wholesale copying of the
plaintiffs secured database) have set the equities in plaintiffs' favor. This fact might supply a
basis for distinguishing the reverse-engineering cases, when the defendant invokes
unconscionability or preemption to vindicate an expressive use of content.
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Thus the First Amendment defense, whether or not it takes the form
of a reimported fair use inquiry, would not protect certain
nonexpressive uses deemed fair or statutorily privileged under the
Copyright Act. 2 35 For its part, conflict preemption offers the prospect
of a federal ruling that would reach any restrictions of uses privileged
under copyright law.
Treatment of the two extreme cases discussed above ought to be
uncontroversial. If, on one hand, a party negotiates an individualized
transaction by which he or she waives certain privileged uses of the
other party's expressive content for value - say, access to the content
in question at a discounted price - the resulting contract ought to be
enforceable. On the other hand, the content purveyor should not be
entitled to impose uniform, restrictive conditions on access to his or
her work in a manner that overrides the Copyright Act. The trouble is
figuring out what to do with the range of cases that could possibly fall
between the two extremes. ProCD was just such a case: ProCD
offered two pricing tiers with different license terms, and Zeidenberg
could have paid more for a license that would have authorized the use
subject to litigation. Judge Easterbrook seized on this fact in his
decision.236 Far from an individually negotiated solution, however,
this was a case in which the plaintiff happened to present an array of
options that included the use that the defendant did not pay for.
Moreover, the use at issue was at least arguably reasonably priced.
An analogous case in the context of website TOU might be one
in which a website - say, an online magazine - posts content
subject to a $1.00 per-page access charge. Users enter a credit card
number, start an account, and pay to view the pages, with no
restrictions on use. The site can enforce the Copyright Act against
content pirates, but a user who pays his or her dollar, accesses a page,
and makes fair use of the content there has no liability. Now imagine
that the site decides to offer the same content at a discount rate - for
free, even - but subject to severe use restrictions that prohibit any
unauthorized reproduction, display or distribution of any part of the
content. Simple "consumption" of the site may be accomplished
gratis, but a critic must pay a toll for the right to reproduce even a
snippet of text from the magazine on his or her weblog. Under
Bowers and ProCD, the Copyright Act would not preempt this model:
235. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (reverse-engineering as fair use); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1123 (D.
Nev. 2006) (caching of indexed web pages for web search as fair use).
236. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996).
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a user can decide whether or not to forfeit fair use privileges at a
dollar per page.
There is some surface appeal to the idea of differentiated
licensing terms, by which a content purveyor allows free or cheaper
access subject to restrictions on lawful uses and restriction-free access
at a price. But there are complications. The first is that such a scheme
is susceptible of two interpretations. In defense of the scheme, a
licensor could argue that the price of restriction-free access is the
price of access, and the cheaper, consumption-only access is available
at a discounted price, conditional on a waiver of lawful uses. A
licensee could colorably counter that the baseline pricing is the
consumption-only pricing, and that the licensor's two-tier scheme in
fact means to compel users to pay for a license to engage in otherwise
lawful uses.237 The law should provide that a user may sell fair uses
(and other statutory privileges), but a content purveyor may not
require users to buy them. However, absent recourse to a
counterfactual - what unfettered access consistent with Copyright
Act defaults would cost - one cannot know which party has sold a
privileged use.
And even assuming one could clear this conceptual impediment
to adjudicating whether a party has sold statutorily privileged uses,
rather than buying them, there remains the fact that the content
purveyor devises its pricing scheme unilaterally. Suppose that the
New York Times makes content personally consumable to the public
online free of charge, but to use today's online content in a manner
fully commensurate with what the Copyright Act allows, one would
be required to pay $1.25. We might well regard this scheme as
reasonable, as we know that hard copies of the Times are available at
newsstands for precisely $1.25. Readers who buy the hard copies are
subject to no license-style impositions on their usage rights, and the
online user who pays the $1.25 finds himself in substantially the same
position. That $1.25 price tag would not necessarily represent the
market value of fair and other privileged uses, but enough people
might swallow it to make it defensible. This case is one in which a
court would have the benefit of something close to a valuation of
unfettered access to the content - because corresponding hard copies
237. The distinction here would matter to the dissenting judge in Bowers, who wrote, in
the course of distinguishing (rather than rejecting) ProCD, that "[t]he Copyright Act does not
confer a right to pay the same amount for commercial and personal use. It does, however, confer
a right to fair use, which we have held encompasses reverse engineering." Bowers v. Baystate
Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1338 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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are sold. 238 But what if the Times decided instead to charge $12.50,
or $125, or $125,000? One could argue that anyone who rejected
these pricing terms in favor of restricted "free" access freely
bargained away their usage rights. Indeed one could argue - albeit
implausibly - that the user sold his or her rights for a whopping
$125,000 value. Such a result could well be agreeable to Judge
Easterbrook, as anyone could contract to make lawful use of the
Times website's content. It is just not clear that they would.
It cannot be enough, then, that a content purveyor can abrogate
the Copyright Act on a "freedom of contract" theory simply by
presenting users with an option - any option - to engage in
copyright-approved uses at an increased "cost of access." Courts
ought to review such pricing schemes for fairness. And more
specifically, they should assess whether the practical effect of the
scheme is to write out by contract uses and privileges that the public
should enjoy under the federal copyright laws. A reasonable standard
might be the one that dissenting Judge Dyk proposed to borrow from
patent law in Bowers: do the TOU "substantially impede" a lawful
public use? 2 39 If the content purveyor does not offer a level of access
consistent with copyright law's defaults, a court should rule it
unenforceable, on any of the three theories we have discussed. If that
level of access is available, but only subject to unreasonable
conditions - price-related or otherwise - a court should refuse to
enforce the resulting use-restrictive contracts. This sort of review,
which reduces to the essential question whether a waiver of privileges
was freely and fairly bargained, calls for case-by-case review of
access pricing schemes, which surely could vary significantly in
material ways from one website to another. Such case-specific review
is problematic because, like the fair use doctrine, outcomes are
difficult to predict and can in fact be inconsistent across jurisdictions.
Indeed, where a website user to make fair use of web content subject
to TOU, the uncertainty is compounded: the prospective defendant
must wonder first, whether a court will regard the TOU as fairly
238. It complicates matters a bit that the New York Times' print and online editions are not
identical in size and scope (the online edition, for example, contains blogs), and that the Times'
primarily ad-driven online business model differs significantly from the way it does business in
the hard copy market. How much of the $1.25 print-edition charge covers the much greater costs
of pressing hard copies on newsprint and distributing them in trucks to retail locations? How
much more valuable to advertisers are the more targeted and topical ads that the Times web
servers deliver in conjunction with specific articles than the general-audience ads in the print
editions? It is not easy to control for these and other factors that make the user experience and
the content purveyor's business different when they go on- or offline.
239. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1335.
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bargained, and second, whether the multi-factor fair use inquiry
supports his or her proposed use.
But courts need not travel too far down this road to invalidate the
lion's share of website TOU that entrench on copyright-approved uses
of the site's content. The tiered pricing that Judge Easterbook
endorsed in ProCD, with all the complications it would raise for
courts seeking to apply a principled "fair and freely bargained"
doctrine, is not at all a common paradigm for the delivery of web
content. Rather, the most common presentation by far is the
browsewrap, personal use-only "agreement" that sticks instantly to
the user the moment he or she visits the site. 2 40 These contracts of
super-adhesion, and their terms that unilaterally and uniformly
abrogate provisions of federal copyright law, ought to present a
simple black-and-white case to courts. If statutory preemption is too
toothless to reach them, then conflict preemption, unconscionability,
and in many cases the First Amendment as well ought to be available
to support a holding that the use restrictions are unenforceable -
provided that courts prove willing and able to reverse the considerable
precedential momentum in favor of rubber-stamping these TOU. One
hopes that courts asked to consider personal use-only website TOU
will recognize the far-ranging implications enforcement of these TOU
would hold for free online expression, as courts applying preemption
and unconscionability doctrines in the software context have not.
V. CONCLUSION
It may be an overstatement to describe the current state of play
on the Internet as a terms of use "crisis." An enforceable contract is
not always enforced, after all; the terms of automated clickwrap and
browsewrap contracts that are (arguably) formed every second
between website proprietors and millions of site visitors might be
ignored by the parties as blithely as they were adopted. Unlike digital
rights management and copy-protection technologies, which
automatically lock down content to prevent privileged and lawful
reproduction and further dissemination of content, TOU require
attentive policing, and they admit the possibility that a site owner will
exercise its judgment and conclude that a certain use is or ought to be
tolerated. And indeed, to this point the law reporters have recorded
very few instances in which content purveyors have litigated to hold
users to the terms of website TOU - and only one case in which the
240. Bialek & Smedresman, supra note 53, at 6 (observing that "the vast majority of Web
site terms of use agreements" appear in a browsewrap format).
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content purveyor sued over a term that restricted fair use of a
content. 2 4 1 The much more common case is a commercial dispute
over a sale of goods or services on the Internet, and the browsewrap
or clickwrap term the plaintiff seeks to enforce is a mandatory
arbitration provision and class action waiver, 24 2 limitation on
liability,2 43 or forum selection clause. 2 44 The state and federal courts
have not witnessed any concerted effort by Big Media entities to
quash street-level discussion or criticism of their content. Websites
that have sought to enforce use-restrictive terms have tended to wield
them against aggressive competitors rather than the end-consumers of
245the content in question.
Moreover, websites may have innocent - or at least
justifiable - reasons to adopt privileged use-restrictive website TOU.
Except where governments restrict access to them, websites are open
to users around the world to view. Not every jurisdiction would
tolerate the range of fair uses available under U.S. copyright law.246 A
website that incorporates copyrighted material of third parties -
licensed or unlicensed - might reasonably conclude that use-
restrictive TOU reduce the likelihood that it might have to answer to
those third party content owners for downstream infringement by the
site's visitors.247 Where the site could be held liable in any nation
under that nation's laws, it might decide that the most prudent course
is to hold visitors to an agreement to engage only in the least
offensive uses of the content they find there. Or a site with an
international consciousness might write TOU tailored to the more
restrictive nations' laws - as opposed to allowing fair or other uses
consonant with the values of U.S. copyright law - because it sees no
reason to give away uses that would be infringing in these more
241. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1167 (E.D. Mo.
2004).
242. See Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. C 07-03967 MHP, 2008 WL 618988, at *4, *7 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 4, 2008).
243. See Druyan v. Jagger, 508 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Doe v.
Sexsearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 734-36 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
244. See Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
245. E.g., Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1102 (C.D.
Cal. 2007); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 976 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
246. See, e.g., Brian F. Fitzgerald, Digital Property: The Ultimate Boundary?, 7 ROGER
WILLAMS U. L. REV. 47, 94 (2001) (explaining that Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom
have a "much more limited and specific fair dealing doctrine" than fair use offers in the United
States).
247. Website TOU commonly express concerns about third-party liability. See, e.g.,
Gawker Media Terms of Use, supra note 89; Mass.Gov Terms of Use, supra note 87.
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stringent jurisdictions, where the content is just as available as it is to
U.S. users. Let the courts appling "softer" copyright laws make the
appropriate exceptions. Finally, these considerations may not have
occurred to websites at all. Now that personal use-only TOU have
become the emerging commercial standard online, many sites will
adopt them as a "best practice" with no particularly invidious
intentions in mind.
All these facts, however, make the use-restrictive website TOU
phenomenon more insidious. It makes for a precarious state of things
to allow online content purveyors to rewrite the rules of engagement
between sites and users - to the exclusive benefit of the sites - and
then rely on their goodwill not to hold users to them. As use-
restrictive TOU continue to proliferate, with little thought given to
what they actually mean in the aggregate, we risk allowing them to
grow so entrenched that courts will not want to disturb them. This
dynamic enabled software distributors to exempt themselves from
copyright's first sale doctrine simply by their own say-so. The
EULA/first sale cases, and others in which the equities might have
favored contract plaintiffs - suits against competitors, or suits over
uses that are not expressive or core privileged uses under the
Copyright Act - have laid the groundwork for courts to enforce
personal use-only TOU. Case law on the books today. This would
support a wholesale conversion of digital environments into
privileged use-free zones at the election of content providers - for no
other reason than that they own and operate web servers and can
condition access to the content there on the user's "agreement" to
draconian TOU. It would have been a much less significant, and
therefore much easier, gesture to reject these TOU before their
promulgation became standard operating procedure on the Internet.
By the time a website plaintiff gets round to asking a court to enforce
TOU against a fair user of its content, or a user who reproduced
unoriginal facts taken from the site, courts may not feel that they are
in a position to say no.
In the meantime use-restrictive TOU chill site visitors from
engaging in First Amendment protected expressive uses of the content
they find on the Internet.2 4 8 Scrupulous surfers of the web - the sort
to follow rules when and where they find them - will want to
comply with the terms that govern access to the sites they visit.
Others may simply be cowed into a personal consumption-only
submission, either because they are unfamiliar with the indulgences
248. Moffat, supra note 45, at 66-67.
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the Copyright Act affords them or because they are familiar with the
case law trends discussed here (which is worse). And if the TOU
themselves do not sufficiently discourage the public from engaging in
copyright-privileged uses, a demand letter from an attorney, citing
potential conflict claims, could nudge the user into compliance. The
chilling effects of these TOU may therefore not be apparent from the
state of the case reporters.
One hopes that a court, if asked to enforce TOU to enjoin or
award damages for otherwise lawful expressive use of web content,
will find a basis to distinguish or repudiate the holdings of ProCD,
Bowers, and Davidson & Associates. The court should accept a
defendant's invitation to examine whether the contract at issue was
freely negotiated, and whether its practical effect is to adjust
copyright's balance of proprietary rights and public privileges
unfairly in the website's favor. Perhaps because they have separately
considered the questions of formation and preemption and
unconscionability, courts to date have unnecessarily cabined their
consideration of the circumstances of formation. Those circumstances
should bear on defenses like preemption and unconscionability. It is
not enough simply to conclude that the defendant agreed to terms, and
because he or she agreed, the other defenses fail. The preemption and
unconscionability defenses require a holistic review of how the
agreement was reached, and what specifically was agreed. Where the
terms are non-negotiable (indeed inescapable, in a browsewrap
format), and they restrict copyright-privileged uses of content, they
ought to be held preempted, unconscionable, and - if the use at issue
is expressive - unconstitutional to enforce. Nothing about the
Internet calls for its content peddlers to be exempt from the policies
established by Congress and the courts to harmonize copyright law
with free expression.
